THE FINAL STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT ABDULLAH ÖCALAN 17 June 1999 / Imrali Island Prison

Draft for the final statement handed out by Mr. Öcalan to his lawyers during their visit on 17 June 1999

1- Carrying the Kurdish problem from a tradition of uprising towards a democratic solution 2- The existing legal system and constitution are an impediment to democratic rights 3- Classic approach to the uprising under the leadership of the PKK only consolidates conflict and lack of solution 4- The republic is a real chance for the option of democratic unity. Reply to the final statements of the Prosecution

1- Dominant is not opposition to the Republic but an understanding of Democratic Unity 2- Central issue is not splitting or derogating the Country but living together in a Free Country 3- The best measure against the mercilessness of any uprising is soonest possible compromise: Peace in freedom and fraternity 4- The side protracting the military process is more responsible for the painful events

The most correct approach as regards the basis of the defence is not to deepen the PKK dilemma but to seek for its resolution.

1- The positions of the PKK both inside and outside the country have to be assessed correctly 2- Foreign vested interests using the PKK have to be known very well 3- The danger of interior chauvinist policy and rentierism using the PKK 4- The unity inside the PKK and its importance for a solution of the problem 5- We have to correctly understand the internal struggles in the 90's. 6- A mistreatment of the contemporary PKK would lead to an irreversible process of falling prey to big games 7- If the emotional atmosphere is overcome and the reasonable taken as a point of departure Turkey will be able to arrive at sound concepts concerning all its fundamental problems and fortify its position

TO THE HONOURABLE CHIEF OF JUSTICE OF THE 2nd CHAMBER OF THE STATE SECURITY COURT ANKARA

I am of the conviction that it is highly important for me to concentrate on a scientific treatment of the reality of the uprising and its consequences as the basis of my final statements in my defence.

The final statements of the Prosecution, being a mere summary of his earlier indictment, feature some quotations from my first defence statements but arrive at the same conclusion. The changes in my person and organization being seen as dishonest and but the expression of a dilemma; punishment according to article 125 of the Turkish Criminal Code is demanded due to the intensity and number of activities [of the PKK] and the continuity of my ties to the organization if only on the level of ideas.

It is absolutely necessary to examine the history and social conditions from which the uprising under the leadership of the PKK arose which has been called the last "Kurdish uprising" even by most senior officials. Not only is it impossible to reduce these events that have brought about the loss of life and property, moral and material losses in the dimension of a war and given rise to manifold positive and negative results to the level of individual terror, moreover does this lead to wrong conclusions and serves to deepen the dilemma. Again, it would be equally insufficient to treat them from the point of view of the given legal system, let alone single laws. But more important, if we refuse to look at the probable outcomes of this social explosion that has shaken the social structure so vehemently, from the point of view of their maximum use for the future, we will fall into even harder dilemma and pave the way for even higher future losses.

The military interventions of 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980 have exposed the fact that the Turkey of the seventies saw a serious social eruption. This has brought some serious legal restrictions that led to the abolition of the constitution of the military intervention of 27 May 1960 with its relatively democratic character and the installation of the constitution of 1982 with its largely anti-democratic character. Prior to 1980, any political party be it pro-government or oppositional, right or left wing had been declared as illegal and [its members] tried in Court.

The PKK was born as an illegal movement of that period and developed into a movement that mainly rested on the social reality of the Kurds in its analysis, propaganda and activities. Its emergence was legitimate if not legal. The legitimacy of an uprising against a system of repression as extensive as the "language ban" of the 1982 constitution should be kept in mind when talking about this being an illegal movement. One should know about the shattering historic fears and backwardness of Kurdish society, the shame even to pronounce one's name. Thus, it shouldn't be surprising that such an uprising has emerged under the conditions of the anarchic character of the era and its severely restrictionist legal conditions. The PKK had set out to formulate an ideological and strategic line for [this uprising] and has openly expressed this in many of its documents. This has also been pointed out in the indictment. I am not going to repeat this. Its main slogan was "Independence and Freedom", a slogan of uprising. And that's what its general program and sporadic activities were also aimed at. This is not being denied. But I do underline the importance of scientifically dealing with this issue. Needless to say that legally speaking punishment is required, I reiterate that it is vital to draw a conclusion on the level of philosophy of law. The objective evaluation of the historic development as much as the internal and external, social and political developments of today, and the situation of the two sides [to the conflict] on this basis will not only enable us to understand the events but also draw the right conclusion.

The PKK, being one of the main responsible forces of the intense [military] activities, has found itself confronted with the discussion about the Kurdish issue in Ankara. Then again, it has learned from the "Kurdish movement" and what has been going on in Northern Iraq. It has slowly transformed itself from a force being influenced by these two factors to one influencing them. It is obvious that its slogans and activities have been determined by these two elements of violence. It is also true that it has attempted and managed to arrive at a certain continuity [of military activities]. But it would be an exaggeration that leads to erroneous conclusions to say that it is the sole creator and thus is the sole responsible force for everything.In all conflict situation around the world implementation of can get out of control and members of organizations involved in conflict may act with impunity. This is not an attempt to clear myself of any responsibility for such acts but this fact should be considered in process of any judgement. The PKK does call for an independent state in its program and slogans and that does make it responsible, but the reality of life is more valid than any program or slogan and teaches us what is realistic. There are manifold examples for this in world history. If we were to evaluate a movement merely by the slogans of a certain period and the essential points of its program that would be insufficiency and falseness in method. Religions such as Islam that come about with an extremely dogmatic ideology and practice, have had different forms of existence in say Mecca or Medina, Damascus or Baghdad or even Istanbul. Again, there are decisive differences from epoch to epoch. Transformations like this can be found in the history of many organizations and movements, even of individuals.

Essentially, no matter how much the PKK might be held responsible for its theory and practice in the legal sense, much of the responsibility goes to the personal features of those living in the society it rests upon, their way of resisting and the kind of oppression they face. In a democratic society, say, or from within a democratic state structure, social formations or individuals inclined to uprising do not emerge in such a number and with such violence. Their slogans and program are not so hard and aimed at separation. Shortly, politics do not come about in this form and the state does not go against it in such a tough way. Just as much as organizations or individuals will be more constructive and reasonable in making politics, the state will show the maturity to act just as reasonable and show the maturity to bring the issue to a solution before it further grows. As a matter of fact, the democratic processes in Europe have developed on this basis. But the individual or tribal conflicts of backward societies may even spread over centuries in a nearly regressive way. It is known how strongly this is still the case in religious, confessional and tribal or family conflicts in Middle-Eastern societies.

I made these short however, as I find, important remarks for the following reason: If the PKK is regarded as the sole responsible force for everything that ever happens, we will be unable to see persons or groups inside the PKK who, contravening the actual character of the PKK, are trying to use it for their own personal ends (or even powers on the governmental level), and thus be unable to determine the degree of responsibility that each of them has, and this in turn will lead to chain reactions. The same might be said about the organisational structure of the PKK. Only if the degree of responsibility from the central [committee] to the rank-and-file member, from the military headquarters to the militant, is being determined in the above outlined way will it be possible to realistically answer the question what individual or organization is responsible for what incident on what level.

Of course I am not saying this should have been done in a short indictment. But the essence of this approach is what I am concerned about. Shortcomings in method bring about severe dangers.

My own situation as an individual I cannot accept to be treated other than in the framework of this understanding. Otherwise, to say "the accused has confessed everything and even more" might legally bear a certain meaning - although, on that level incomplete and mostly falsely understood statements have been used - but is rather far from expressing the political and moral point I am making. An assessment that bears much more shortcomings and wrongs than correct points is unacceptable.

So while accepting my outstanding individual responsibility from ideology to organization and activities, my role in the ideological change, the developments, the struggle inside the organization and the prevailing civil activities, as well as my objection to any form of violence apart from legitimate defence can by no means be denied. It is not difficult for me to afford comprehensive written evidence on these points. Some words or statements that go beyond their aim should not make one ignore my fundamental position.

Transformation of the PKK is not a dilemma but a necessity

The collapse of the Soviet System at the end of the 1990's carries at least as much potential to influence democratic transformations as did the French Revolution of 200 years ago. It has really opened the way for democratisation processes in many countries all over the world, especially in the Eastern Block. Just as much as the Soviet October Revolution has been the most important external factor influencing the national liberation in Turkey, the collapse has created deeply positive conditions for Turkey and the other Turkmen Republics to emancipate themselves from the status quo of the Cold War period that had prevented democratization. What is certainly more decisive is that with the earlier republican experience there clearly was a phase of democratic movement even if under great pains, and that the social and political texture of Turkey has changed its appearance at high speed, even if this does not find its reflection in the legal system. And this was also experienced in Kurdish society, here in a revolutionary way in the "Serhildan" (mass uprisings). Even if the objective fact that there are Kurds has no legal reflection - the language ban, however, was lifted in that period - it is being recognised even in the highest positions of the state. This is an important democratic step even if it lacks legal guarantees. But at the same time the period was full of armed clashes.

When talking about the reality of a transformation of the PKK we specially rest on the objective developments in the world and in Turkey. The founding years of the PKK were years of outrageous denial of the fact that there are Kurds and of their own lack of will-power under the status quo of the Cold War. Kurds themselves were also polarized according to the ideological frontiers of the Cold War. Then, that era bears the mark of a youth that is to a large extend split up in the camps of left and right, acting in a rather anarchic way without being acquainted with the meaning of democratization. Its programme and its practice [the PKK] as well bears the marks of the dogmatic and ideological approach of the radical youth movement of these years. The structure of organizations in Turkey is subject to an inexorable transformation just as much as many organizational structures all over the world have been in the 1990's. This already is the case and will be even more so in the future. The PKK is bound to bear such developments due to its involvement in an intense armed conflict. So for that reason the fact that I have abandoned the program and old propaganda slogans of the PKK and searched for new things is not a dilemma but expresses an inexorability. What deserves criticism is the fact that this came late and was not formulated clearly enough and that it did not find sufficient reflection in the congresses and the program of the PKK. The necessity of a transformation cannot be denied. Therefore, the program has been overcome. I.e. the programmatic formulation of a separate state or a similar entity has proven unrealistic and unnecessary. This is what we mean when we say that those years were not used in a constructive way and were merely repeating one another. In trying to overcome [the said formulation] I have said - and this can be seen from many a document - that independence and freedom can most progressively, most practically, most meaningfully be realised within the boundaries of Turkey. This is not a narrow tactics. This is a matured view that derives from an experience that has learned important lessons from life. We have also arrived at the position that if we are to be with the state, this again will be most meaningful within the framework of a democratizing Turkish Republic, and this position is documented in some speeches I delivered prior to my arrest.

It must not be seen as incoherence that I spoke about my journey to Europe as an attempt [of the Kurds] to become a state and at the same time have announced the above position. If separation had been the dominant aspect one might have spoken of incoherence or of simple regret. But with regard to my general assessment of the will of the Kurds over the last years one can see that there is no incoherence. For example, everyone says that there is a Kurdish political formation in Northern Iraq, a federal state even, that has evolved under the close scrutiny of Turkey. This shows that there is a process of state-building in that sense of the word and both the roles of Turkey and of the PKK are prominent and undeniable. A similar development that is undeniable is the local political power of the HADEP that has become what I would call an authority by winning the provincial councils and municipalities in over 40 constituencies. This undoubtedly means a democratic process of state-building in the sense that there is a unity in political will on the basis of a Democratic Republic, for the first time such a unanimous political will has shown itself in Kurdish society and has formed itself to be a part of the state power within a unitary state. Therefore, it is no incoherence or dishonesty when I speak about the process of [the Kurds] building a state but rather shows that I point my finger at an objective reality. What is true is that it is a dilemma to make politics and become a power [inside the state] on the basis of narrow separationism. But to occupy a place in the state structures and become a political power on the basis of democratic participation within the unity of Turkey is a historic development par excellence. Despite all hinderance and obstacles this developments is taking its course step by step.

What I tried to express in my theses on a democratic solution even if late and not formulated in the way it was supposed to be formulated was the foresight and the will to recognise this historic development and participate in it. This is neither a tactical attempt to save the day nor an unprincipled turn-around. It is my attempt to learn a lesson from the large scale world-wide developments that we can witness nearly each day in one of its manifestations; to give priority to our own burning and highly important problems no matter under which conditions and to play the role I am expected to play. It is the admittedly insufficient attempt to outline some theses for a new program of the PKK and a political line on a legal level which I believe to be an honest and correct attempt that is the result of theoretical and political experience that rests on a rather long accumulation of knowledge. I have no doubts that a proper understanding of the thoughts I tried to expose will contribute constructively and significantly to overcoming the dead-lock in the general democratization and the Kurdish issue which claims for itself to play the key-role here.

It is true that I have led an inner struggle about the PKK's understanding of organization and activities

Talking about my responsibility for the PKK, it is well possible to describe it as the longest and most wide-spread "Kurdish uprising" and indeed realistic to talk about the painful and merciless sides of this uprising. But as soon as we come to the responsibility and competence of individuals and structures inside the PKK, the truth comes out in a different way.

It can be hardly said that the [military] activities under the leadership of the PKK had developed into a proper guerrilla warfare in terms of basic strategy and tactics. Even the more wrong would it be to suppose that the way of warfare of the high-ranking responsible persons had been the way I wanted it to be. It would be a more appropriate sociological description to say that it is the sediments of the tribal, family and religious backwardness deriving from the heavily feudal structure of Kurdish society with its partitions and contradictions that have strained over hundreds of years and now became alive and began to talk within the PKK. Anybody participating [in the military activities] thinks "mine is the law" and displays a behaviour and practice that is even contravening the rules of a feudal social order, never mind the essence of the official administrative rules of the PKK. Especially in 1997, under the name of an offensive against village guards, there were attacks on civilians, among them women and children, that should never be the target of military attacks. Exactly at that point some people completely ignoring even the limited ideological and political aspects of the PKK have tried to start an internal power struggle by saying "the intellectuals have lost" and "peasantry has taken over" and trying to liquidate the real values of the party. They used the resources they had taken hold of in order to take over the representation of the party and at the same time get the people under their individual influence. I called them the "Gang of Four" because of the people who led this attempt. I find it important that people know that I was involved in quite a tough struggle against this from 1987-97. This definitely does not alleviate my general responsibility, but is important to understand my moral, political, organizational and practical position. It is not difficult to find out that the activities that harmed the PKK most have mainly happened in that period and by the hands of people like these who tried to take control by themselves. These people have used the advantages that the rural area [of guerrilla warfare] has rendered them very well and implemented what they knew, mostly covering up for their deeds by lies. They have not even withheld themselves from punishing their closest comrades or some supporters from the people under cheap pretensions, just to gain influence. We are confronted here with a more dangerous form of the primitive character of power in Kurdish society, its cruelty, the despotism of feudal landlords and tribal leaders. Similar things have happened [in the course of liberation struggles] of many backward societies, for example in Africa, and in the past of any people. The similar character of the Kurdish social formations in Northern Iraq is widely known. Moreover, the Ottoman Dynasty has even made fratricide for the sake of power a decree. A guard of Mustafa Kemal during the National Liberation called Topal Osman has arbitrarily killed a parliamentarian inside parliament, buried people alive, until he was killed by a special order of Ataturk. There are some similar incidents concerning Ethem, the Circassian [leader of a resistance army against Britain] that might be worth examination. I am giving these examples to say that similar cruelties occur quite often during uprisings or guerrilla wars. And it is well documented that there was a systematic struggle against those who acted like a Gang [inside the PKK]. It is known that there were comprehensive educational and organizational efforts against them and that the most deviated ones of them could only be neutralized by internal struggles.

So if these internal fights have been going on in the 90's, why is it that the prosecutors give a list that mainly refers to destruction and casualties? The answer can be found if one considers that both internal and external clashes have been most intense during that period. The official Susurluk Report [about parliamentary investigations into the relations between police forces, drug Mafia and fascist death squads and politicians] openly states that especially from 1993 to 1996 that there also was a high rate of incidents outside state control, especially for the death squad assaults and disappearances, and that the state has used its powers in illegal ways. And it speaks about a still undiscovered gang structure [inside the state]. According to official statistics, there are about 18,000 murders by unknown assailants. These numbers are being used against the PKK [although the state admits not to know who has killed these people]. In short, the chaos of these years was quite an advanced one. And this has very much to do with the conflict with the PKK. Similar if not even crueller events have happened in Bosnia and Kosovo and in the past in Palestine and Ireland in the course of armed conflicts. Against this background it is understandable that it was hard to control the PKK which had become a major power for the first time and didn't want to lose this position, and especially when one considers how the individuals [fighting in the PKK] had grown up. The PKK has not succeeded to become a regular armed force (any activity of which is happening on the basis of orders.) No matter how hard it was tried, success was limited. I am not saying this because I don't see my own responsibility, I am saying this so that reality may be understood as it is. I have issued many commands and perspectives, I have tried hard to educate [our cadres] but this was not enough to implement my own ideas and the official tactical line of the organization, it all remained limited. Individual or local initiatives were dominant.

This is the truth about the events that have caused huge pains inside and outside our organization, events that cannot be approved and that show a clear deterioration. Over the last years these incidents have decreased that much that one might say they don't occur any more since the said persons and structures have been neutralized to a significant extend. This has happened due to the internal struggle. I would like to reiterate that such incidents have not occurred as much as they did in other violent conflicts and that in spite of all the [governmental] propaganda they have been rather limited in our organization. An objective observer will not find it hard to establish the degree of my personal responsibility.

A similar, even more striking situation was the case for the years after 1996, when the state began to gain control over its own structures and the death-squad assaults dropped to a minimum level. Shortly, I find it important to throw some light on the organization's and my personal responsibility for those years which were the stage of so much pain and so many losses both in terms of number and in terms of quality. The "Killer of 30,000 people" and the "Baby killer" are unfair, unjust and unreal accusations. I reproach them. What is true is that there was a struggle to legitimately live like human beings and that many sacrifices were given for a more democratic society and republic. Now if this [struggle] has not been as it was supposed to be and if there were incidents and killings that I will never accept and that cannot be approved politically and morally, justice is done when the objective and subjective responsibilities of both sides have been truly established. I am one of the main responsible persons. But I am not the only one. In this social uprising, the democratic and cultural demands of which have been officially recognised a few times without the necessary being done, everybody from the highest organs of the state to the backward and stupid, cruel persons, all of us are responsible. To realise this as soon as possible and to do whatever any of us has to do is a necessity for a correct political and moral understanding. A fair legal system can only emerge from such an ethical philosophy and on the basis of democratic policy.

This is what I have to say about my responsibility for the armed clashes, the casualties and painful realities that I am supposed to be responsible for. I have no doubts that it is me who has the most demand and who most deserves a peace in justice. I will always employ all means I have and try to do what is my duty, so much is for certain.

Two roads and two historic outcomes of the relation between Turkey and the Kurds and the Kurdish uprising

The lack of a scientific-democratic approach to the Kurdish issue is the fundamental reason why Turkey has not been able to achieve interior democratization and a leading role appropriate to its potential in its foreign relations ever since the foundation of the Republic. Until today, the way of dealing with the matter was that of mutual uprising and repression, however without any of the sides learning from these experiences just injuring one another. Neither in the diagnosis nor in the treatment was there a scientific approach. Mutual fears and vested economic or day-to-day political interests have pressed so hard that no result was obtained and the whole problem has escalated. Sometimes it was thought that a proper criminal persecution would solve the problem, at other times some concessions were given to any odd feudal tribal or religious leader who appeared and thus the situation calmed down, then again it was thought that everything would be solved through mere educational facilities and economic progress. Since any of these attempts was to an ever growing extend founded on the denial [of the Kurdish identity] even the slightest counter move that tried to base itself on the issue as such was condemned to be radical.

Nowadays everybody talks about the radicalism of the methods of the PKK without actually seeing how the rulers behaved historically and politically. Repression that goes as far as banning a language necessarily causes any resistance to be violent and thus sparks off yet another wave of repression. It should be understood by now that a one-dimensional and un-historical approach to the matter won't serve any other purpose than to inflate the problem to the size of mountains. On the threshold of the year 2000 everyone feels almost physically that Turkey is in a complete dead-lock due to the Kurdish issue. While some, especially those actively participating in the war, are confronted with immense pains and losses; a small layer of people has found a lifestyle and style of politicking based on the mega profits and the political power they draw from the war as its rentiers. Literally, a social partition of labour has been established. This fact plays a crucial role in the rentier economy, the tremendous social degeneration and in the disfunctionality of politics over the last years. As if Turkey was bound to this destiny it has become a socially widespread habit to go for one's own narrow day-to-day personal or group advantages rather than searching for a solution. This is a highly dangerous state for any society. The essence of this dead-lock is the complete absence of constructive political ideas or basic ethic norms within the active social forces on the one hand and an extreme insensitivity of the state forces on the other hand. As long as this equilibrium is not terminated, any progress of Turkey remains unthinkable.

By the beginning of the 1990's there was a limited development concerning a scientific and democratic approach to democratization in general and its most important part, the Kurdish issue or however one might prefer to call it. The fact that no use was made of it sparked off what may have been the most devastating effects in the history of Turkey. A meaningless insistence on war has brought casualties to a dimension that is hard to bear for either of the sides involved. Social degeneration and narrow economic greed have reached their hey-day in our times.

I don't want to dwell on this issue any longer since it was extensively mentioned in the prosecutors' indictment and final statements and in my previous defence statement. The Imrali Trial itself is characterized by this very dead-lock - and yet rests upon the said historic, social and political reality. So will the trial remain locked on to the tradition of political jurisdiction and serve to escalate the problem? Or will it show a glimpse of a break-away, in favour of questioning the future, at least in terms of the way it approaches the matter? These are the most burning questions demanding an urgent answer. The answers the trial gives to these questions will determine in how far it manages to break away from classical lawsuits. But even now I am positive that both in society and on the governmental level - inside Turkey and abroad - there are intense discussions about these two questions and their answers, and these discussions do bring about results.

I see it as my historic duty to answer these questions from my own point of view. The answers I will give will make up the essence of my defence. As far as the discussion about my responsibility for the emergence and the development of the Kurdish issue and thus the uprising is concerned, I feel that the most important dimension of my responsibility is to answer the questions what kind of future we have to await from the conflict or uprising and how a new order might be shaped. I am convinced that it is of vital importance that the answers concerning the future are as important as the answers concerning the past.

Nothing can be as unsatisfactory as judging the PKK according to the narrow criteria of Criminal Law. I am concerned to overcome this danger in my trial. It is true that the history of the PKK has left a violent impact on the last quarter of a century of Turkey. But it is more true that it will have an even higher impact on the future of Turkey, both from the point of view of intensity and of duration. Just as much as the 21st Century will be lost for Turkey if we don't judge matters right, a correct judgement will not only relief Turkey from this its haunting key problem but will even empower it to become the leading country of the region in the coming century. How true and important it indeed may be to say that Turkey is standing at the cross-roads, at a turning point; what is even more important is to say that now, mistakes and failures are inexcusable and that we are absolutely condemned to arrive at a proper solution. The real dishonesty and the real treason here is not to see what's right and not to undertake any effort to such ends. Infantile mistakes occur as much in the history of organizations as they do occur in the ontogenesis of individuals. Up to a certain point one may act understandingly and forgivingly. But those who insist on their mistakes, who are unable to play their historic roles even at such a advanced stage cannot escape from being held responsible for their shortcomings and for treason. That's why I think it is my basic responsibility to question the future of the PKK as much as to judge its past and to define my role in possible future developments. No matter what this approach of mine may contribute to the legal judgement of the past, I am sure that it will play an important role in any progress on the political field and even in economy and foreign relations. I believe that it will contribute analytically to establishing the move that Turkey is expected to make in the region to become a leading force on the basis of a Democratic Republic respecting human rights and democracy, a move that is being discussed for some time now.

To insist on Dilemma and Armed Conflict means to loose the coming Century.

If the Kurdish issue is being dealt with in the classical way, far from democratic and cultural considerations, the outcome of the Imrali Island sessions will be an escalated continuation of the dilemma and thus of the armed conflict that relies on quite a strong infrastructure. I find the assessments that were made during the court sessions in a heavily emotional, stifling and oppressive atmosphere extremely dangerous - not so much for myself but for the future of the country. Since this trial deals with issues that are incomparably bigger than my physical existence is, all the possible outcomes have to be seen very clearly. This is certainly not meant as a threat. It's only about possible events that those with advanced political and strategic analytical power can foresee anyway:

1- The military armed conflict will institutionalize and continue. It is obvious that the PKK will be able to continue like this for years, relying on its positions inside the country and in most of the important countries of the world, on both sides of the frontiers, on its experience, its logistic supply powers, its facilities of receiving weapons, its financial resources, its recruitment power and increasing reserves and its rootedness in the advantageous geographic environment. It can conveniently wage a low or medium scale war. The army as well may continue this war much longer due to its experience and superior technical facilities. And the likelihood that this military option wins out is quite high indeed. Never mind the last 15 years, it may spread over the whole coming century. Of course the slippery position of the region with its proneness to any sort of alliances carries the risk that the conflict will be further incited by politico-military relations on a world scale. Perhaps it is a candidate for the most risky battlefield of the world. Because there is a lot of conflicting interests here. Northern Iraq is but a small example for that. It is hard to determine where this will be leading to.

Most probably, the new Arabic option, with or without Saddam, will interfere by furthering the relations they do have already with the PKK on one or another level according to their conflicts with Turkey. The Water Question and some historic and economic interests will add to their posing a serious threat as far as an escalation of the armed conflict is concerning. Such activities will increase with the support of solidarious countries, relying on the Kurds in general and the PKK in special.

Iran will be a fundamental factor in the continuation of the armed conflict due to its traditional ideological conflicts with Turkey, relying on the Hisbullah but much more so on the Kurds, on the PKK. The probability of tense relations is very high.

Syria will play an important part in the escalation of the conflict: Having made peace with Israel, Syria will concentrate on the contradictions with its northern neighbour Turkey, be it on the subject of the province Antakya (Antiochia/Alexandrette), be it on the Water Question, be it due to its relations to Iraq and even Iran. It will see the PKK as a closer ally than ever.

Independent and more intense relations between Israel and the Kurds are inevitable after its peace with the Arabs, perhaps even on quite an advanced level.

The traditional contradictions between Turkey and the Turkic republics,some Caucasus and Balkan countries might develop further, an anti-Turkey politics of Armenia, Serbia or Cyprus might develop in the short run and naturally seek to use the PKK and thus will be in a position to really escalate the war. A continuos development of interest and relations is inevitable and will accelerate the logistic and technical supply.

The role of Europe and Greece as a part of it is quite clear. Inevitably, its multi-dimensional role as an area where the Kurds are most institutionalized and from where they can draw a lot of strength will continue in many ways.

Even if there was an alliance between America, England and Turkey, their plan over Iraq, expected Israeli-Arab reconciliation and thus developments of relations with the Arab world, and also attempts to develop relations with Iran could all reach unexpected dimensions as it has in the case of Northern Iraq.

These strategic powers all have a high potential to enter into relations with the Kurds and thus with the PKK due to their own interests, even if these relations are limited now and most of these powers proclaim that they were against the PKK. This potential in turn might contribute to escalate the armed conflict.

The other factor that might serve to widen the armed conflict is the Kurdish population of Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Caucasus and in fact all over the world. These scattered people might unite, and the PKK has achieved this unity to an important extend. This is a new development that deserves examination. There are the conditions to benefit from all these areas and people in terms of logistics, man-power, financial resources and relations.

If we also consider the geographic conditions, the significant support the Kurds of Turkey give and our sympathizers and members in the prisons, the dimensions of the risk of conflict might be understood better.

We could explore this point much further but the above remarks might already show that there is a dangerous and destructive potential that cannot be compared to the past, that might grow and be activated. This is the most dangerous aspect for the future.

An intensification of human rights and democracy deficiencies that might be compared to the past situation in the Lebanon or the contemporary situation of Yugoslavia or Iraq would bring a growing isolation of Turkey and might turn it into the stage of dangerous scenarios. The positions the Kurdish movement has gained in Northern Iraq and many other places all over the world and its degree of institutionalization will obviously serve as a pretext for interventions similar to that in the Kosovo crisis once the conditions have ripened. These conditions, the extreme nationalist wave [in Turkey] that would further escalate if the armed conflict continues and the imminent petrification of the power structures [of Turkey] indicate that quite shattering developments will take place.

The only option to prevent such processes is a democratic way of dealing with problems, first of all the Kurdish problem. The policy of 'Peace at home, peace abroad' [a slogan of Ataturk] proves right at this very point.

Two roads and two historic outcomes of the relation between Turkey and the Kurds and the Kurdish uprising

Nowadays everybody talks about the radicalism of the methods of the PKK without actually seeing how the rulers behaved historically and politically. Repression that goes as far as banning a language necessarily causes any resistance to be violent and thus sparks off yet another wave of repression. It should be understood by now that a one-dimensional and unhistorical approach to the matter won't serve any other purpose than to inflate the problem to the size of mountains. On the threshold of the year 2000 everyone feels almost physically that Turkey is in a complete dead-lock due to the Kurdish issue. While some, especially those actively participating in the war, are confronted with immense pains and losses; a small layer of people has found a lifestyle and style of politicking based on the mega profits and the political power they draw from the war as its rentiers. Literally, a social partition of labour has been established. This fact plays a crucial role in the rentier economy, the tremendous social degeneration and in the disfunctionality of politics over the last years. As if Turkey was bound to this destiny it has become a socially widespread habit to go for one's own narrow day-to-day personal or group advantages rather than searching for a solution. This is a highly dangerous state for any society. The essence of this dead-lock is the complete absence of constructive political ideas or basic ethic norms within the active social forces on the one hand and an extreme insensitivity of the state forces on the other hand. As long as this equilibrium is not terminated, any progress of Turkey remains unthinkable.

To insist on Dilemma and Armed Conflict means to loose the coming Century.

Independent and more intense relations between Israel and the Kurds are inevitable after its peace with the Arabs, perhaps even on quite an advanced level.

The traditional contradictions between Turkey and the Turkic republics, some Caucasus and Balkan countries might develop further, an anti-Turkey politics of Armenia, Serbia or Cyprus might develop in the short run and naturally seek to use the PKK and thus will be in a position to really escalate the war. A continuos development of interest and relations is inevitable and will accelerate the logistic and technical supply.

The role of Europe and Greece as a part of it is quite clear. Inevitably, its multi-dimensional role as an area where the Kurds are most institutionalised and from where they can draw a lot of strength will continue in many ways.

If we also consider the geographic conditions, the significant support the Kurds of Turkey give and our sympathisers and members in the prisons, the dimensions of the risk of conflict might be understood better.

An intensification of human rights and democracy deficiencies that might be compared to the past situation in the Lebanon or the contemporary situation of Yugoslavia or Iraq would bring a growing isolation of Turkey and might turn it into the stage of dangerous scenarios. The positions the Kurdish movement has gained in Northern Iraq and many other places all over the world and its degree of institutionalisation will obviously serve as a pretext for interventions similar to that in the Kosovo crisis once the conditions have ripened. These conditions, the extreme nationalist wave [in Turkey] that would further escalate if the armed conflict continues and the imminent petrification of the power structures [of Turkey] indicate that quite shattering developments will take place.

Conclusion: The Imrali process can be a historic starting-point

As it has been outlined above the legal process on Imrali Island might be evaluated as a chance in terms of being the starting-point of a new process. Any social order one comes across in history is the fruit of a major conflict. I believe that the outcome of this conflict and this uprising is the democratic social order of the future. Inexorably any insistence on the but dilemma and the conflict will escalate negative historic developments, a positive and analytical approach will end the conflict and create the grounds for lasting peace and fraternity. Therefore, it is extremely important that we do not misuse our pains and our casualties as instruments of revenge but as a strong corollary for a solution and for peace. We have to tackle our problems with maturity and reason and carefully evaluate our losses and gains. Important social problems will always cause pains and losses as long as they are not solved. Both history and the present are full of even more devastating examples for that.

In the light of the lessons we might learn from correctly examining the uprisings that have evolved from long historical processes and that have indeed had significant social reasons, we see that it is possible and equally necessary to make sure that the `Insurgency Movement` under the leadership of the PKK has indeed been the last one and that the armed conflict has been the ultimate one. In my defence, I have basically tried to outline this very point. It might be insufficient, it might have certain shortcomings, but I would like to stress that I have pointed at the right way and that I am as honest as I am eager to walk this way. The scientific and democratic content of this approach is beyond discussion. It should not be seen as a flaw or a dilemma that I have tried to arrive at moral and political values and see them as a solution rather than delivering a defence in the legal sense of the word. It should rather be seen as a milestone in a historic development. And the fact that any other approach to the matter would not go beyond deepening the actual dilemma should be taken as the result of long experience.

What I can do in my life after now is to contribute to a new peace and fraternity process alongside the strong people to whom I am closely bound. Against this background it is historically important to see the positive decision that we made for the Democratic Republic against this background. I will no doubt do what is necessary if given the chance to do so. The honesty of my words can only prove itself by my practical deeds.

The reasonability of the state is without doubt of crucial importance. I find the statement that the Terror and Intelligence Branch of the Police has made following the first day of my trial quite important and would therefore like to quote from it:

"To undertake some steps to solve the South-Eastern problem does not mean to make concessions to the PKK. The public has to be prepared for that. The media has an important job to do. If the state makes a positive step and the incidents decline even by 50% this is a big development... The state does not approach the problem with revenge or feudal emotions but scientifically. If there is a way open to fundamentally solve the problem the state will not be intransigent. According to the results one gets from this trial, the state will also make a few democratic and cultural steps and end this whole business at last. The Turkish people cannot endure living with terror any longer."

We are confronted with a selected example of the mature and reasonable approach of the state. The desired results will show up as soon as this approach becomes practical. We should pay a bit more attention to the fact that with the unilateral cease-fire of 1st September 1998, and even in face of the Imrali trial, the incidents have not declined to 50% but to a much lower level. This level has not been reached because of weakness (of the PKK) or by itself. A responsible approach, the need to start a new process, on the one hand, the reasonability of the state and on the other hand our answer within the confinements of our powers are the factors that brought about this level. What is necessary next - and the statement mentions it - is that steps are being taken, that the PKK lays down arms and that this business is ended which our people can no longer endure. I reiterate my belief that I can play my role successfully by using my moral authority.

The way to a democratic solution now leads us to developing the democratic system and drawing its outlines. Some excerpts from the speech the President of the Constitutional Court has delivered for the 37th jubilee of the Court raise some hopes and point at the right way:

"In a lawful, social, laicistic and democratic state respecting human rights such as the Republic of Turkey, it is obliging to protect and foster human rights and freedoms according to contemporary universal standards." "Another restriction imposed upon the freedom of speech is in terms of language. Paragraph 3 of article 26 says that 'no prohibited language must be used in the expression and distribution of thoughts'. However, the European Convention of Human Rights does not comprise any rules according to which the use of a certain language for the expression and distribution of thoughts might be constrained."

"The efforts to lift the confinements and prohibitions in constitution and law and to reach the level of contemporary democracies in terms of human rights continue. Our media, civil society organisations and intellectuals have made some proposals towards a wider space for the freedom of speech in the constitution. We hope that a public opinion and a political will emerging thus may effect some constitutional changes. As an indication of the level of civilisation the widely accepted human rights norms that are swiftly progressing internationally should be reflected in our law, our constitution and legal rules should be revised with respect to international agreements and the universal standards aimed at in covenants should be incorporated in our legal system."

These lines set out the foundation of democratic and cultural rights and show a way toward a solution. This is where it is going to and it is a necessity of contemporary, democratic civilisation that sooner or later will emerge. The Democratic Republic of Turkey and its Democratic Constitution will be its concrete expression.

I declare that I believe that in spite of my conviction on grounds of article 125 of Criminal Law I will no doubt be acquitted morally and politically by history, and I reiterate my highest wish to serve for an honourable peace with justice in a Democratic Republic which I regard as a virtue.