DECLARATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION OF THE KURDISH QUESTION

THE DEFENCE ARGUMENTS THAT THE HEAD OF THE PKK ABDULLAH OCALAN PRESENTED AT "THE TRIAL OF THE CENTURY"

I - INTRODUCTION

My defence is not so much based on detailed replies to the charges in the indictment prepared by the Chief Prosecutor [of the State Security Courts], but rather, is it about what I see as a more important topic: how to reach a historic reconciliation from a revolt under the leadership of the PKK and increase the possibility of a solution to the Kurdish issue. I have created an opportunity for peace to these [armed] activities that could very well be called a law-intensity war.

Actually, I voiced these views for the first time as a response to President Turgut Ozal's call [for a cease fire?]. At the historic press conference on 15 March, 1993 [where I declared the cease fire], this is exactly what I said: "We are not demanding an immediate separation from Turkey. We are realists on this subject. Do not interpret this [cease fire] as a simple tactic [serving a hidden agenda]. There are many reasons as to why [we are realists]. Those who understand the historic, political and economic situation of the two peoples [the Kurds and Turks], know well that separation could not take place. They [the Kurds and Turks] are intertwined like flesh and bone. I have emphasized this in many interviews. We want the relations to be rearranged. Knotted relations and contradictions of a thousand years await untangling. Our fundamental understanding rests on a free and equal rearrangement of [Kurdish-Turkish relations]. To dub us "separatists" at every opportunity, is in fact the attitude that aims to fan separatism. The current arrangement of relations is hugely draining the life and the wealth of both the Turkish and the Kurdish people."

Here is what I clearly said on the occasion of our latest unilateral cease fire on 1 September 1998 before I was handed to Turkey at the end of a plot carried out by an international force: "The war, if not originating from a very important contradiction, is a madness. Especially, meaningless terror and violence should never be part of human affairs. If this huge oppression of us is let up a bit and stopped; if human rights and democracy are promoted to improve our relations; and if problems are solved through dialogue, I don't think you will find any other people and organization that are as thirsting for peaceful methods as us." I continued with these words, "right now the most fundamental problem of Turkey is to take democracy out of its state of demagoguery and trust it to the care of the people. This should not be taken as bashing the Republic. Especially, divisive and separatist, it never is. If anything, it is a wish for democratizing the Republic. This indeed is in the interest of Turkey. This is, if anything, to resuscitate Turkey from its currently choked off state. Those who speak and act in the name of the Republic must do something about this counter-democracy. This is basically what I said about violence."

"We are the side that has suffered the most from this violence. Who could blame us if, in this state of horrific imbalance of forces, in order to avoid extermination, we were forced to defend ourselves, our most legitimate rights, our identity and culture? The UN Constitution and even the Constitution of the Turkish Republic recognizes [the legitimacy of] the defense of these rights." I am quoting these because, some people might falsely interpret that I have adopted these views due to the harsh conditions of my solitary confinement. I have the impression that even in the indictment, my statements advocating the same views - taken under interrogation - were by-passed.

However, [my statements] also express the need to transform the structure of the PKK, its narrow and strict ideological approach - a remnant of the fiery 1970s -, and its political structure in the light of the developments in the world and in Turkey in the 1990s. I have emphasized the need for reviewing, revising and updating its principles and programme in the aftermath of a huge experience. Throughout these years, I have increasingly searched to broaden [the PKK's world view]. The same is true about my views on violence. [Excessive] violence even in defence of basic human rights, identity and cultural survival is rejected. It is well known that I have struggled within the organization against practices of violence that went beyond the basic minimum. The indictment does not touch on these points. Also, it is not objective to heap under the rubric of "terror" all the negativity on one side [of the warring parties]. I do not feel compelled to criticize these aspects much. I do not find it necessary to defend myself on these points. Perhaps, my lawyers could open these matters more in their defence that concentrates more on the legal aspects.

The most important thing for me - irrespective of its name, origins and rationale - is to lay bare the necessity of peace for this extensive armed movement which is even officially dubbed a "low intensity war". To find a reasonable solution, remembering the rule that "each war has a peace", became the main focus of my defence. It is of great importance [for me] to evaluate the past, to update the programme and the political line [of the Kurdish movement] in the light of the current, concrete facts in order to facilitate a solution. This is also one of many things expected from me. It was the most practical thing to transform [the PKK platform]into a platform for peace since this is what I was striving to do just before my abduction. In general, the PKK's [ideological] defences have followed the two opposing extremes: Either a stubborn defence of the classical line, or the abandonment of that line. This, in a sense, is the same as having no solution. In my defence, I made it a point to I go beyond this.

In my defence, I did not revert to either a classical Kurdish nationalist line or a leftist interpretation of a similar tendency. Developments went beyond [both tendencies]. I did not find it very necessary to go into lengthy discussions of the historical, social, and identity issues. It was more appropriate to leave them to social scientists as topics for research. Otherwise, my leaving them aside does not emanate from any serious political concerns. Also, we had several similar expositions and evaluations in the past. For the same reason I did not go into a political criticism of Turkey either. To reiterate often-debated points did not appeal to me as creative. The same point is valid for the PKK's programme, its structure and actions. Rather than discussing these topics which I have done elsewhere extensively, I found it important to emphasise as to what kind of transformation is needed to satisfy the need for a solution at this time. Political parties are a means to an end. If they do not transform themselves as time requires, they will become an obstruction, outdated and inevitably defeated. An unproductive repetition, no matter how heroic, cannot contribute much to the ideal of freedom.

In my defence statement, I am not concerned with a legalistic defence for myself. It is so obvious to me that even the most basic rules of the existing constitution [in Turkey] are violated in my case. In addition, at a time when [the state] is insistent on denying the [Kurdish] identity, what is essential is to emphasise the ethical and political need for resistance. This, perhaps, will not change the outcome of the trial. However, it will leave for future [generations] a very precious legacy of solving the problem. I especially made sure that I paid attention to this [poignant issue].

I have put the issues into writing in the form of theses without being overly concerned with more details. Under these circumstances, I did not deem it necessary. Besides, I have not had much opportunity [to have access to defence materials] anyway.

The main thread that runs through my defence, even if repetitious at times, is the concept of a "democratic solution". This time I went into details of this approach which I had touched on in a limited way previously. Leslie Lipson's book The Democratic Civilization which accidentally reached my hands, contributed to [my understanding of this [detailed approach]. "The right of nations for self-determination" which was fashionable in the 1970s, and which in practical terms meant establishing a separate state, was, in fact, a blind alley in this specific [context]. In the case of Kurdistan, it was obstructing the solution rather than solving the problem. In my practice, I have tried to surpass these [limitations]. When I saw in practice, how backward and sometimes obstructive even the alternatives such as establishing a separate state, federalism, autonomy and similar approaches were in comparison to the rich mode of solutions democracy offered. It became very important for me to concentrate on the democratic system. The gradual occlusion of the military approaches, that is the armed struggle also has a share in this change of [directions] in our movement. Especially, given the traditional [Kurdish] uprisings where the rebellion - suppression cycle predominates, an approach that did not contain force and violence was urgently needed, not only in the Kurdish movement but also globally.

The uniqueness of Turkish - Kurdish relations, the inviolability of the national pact borders, and the current political and military situation necessitated a solution within a democratic system not only as historically correct, but nearly the only alternative. The urgent need for a comprehensive peace yearned for by everyone constituted the basis of our offer. Due to these reasons, the charming richness of the "democratic mode of finding a solution" is superior to the obstructing military and even to the [old] political style. [This offer] soothes the fundamental problem of Turkey and this historic stage of its general democratization like a [well-prescribed] medicine. And moreover, the key approach of the state - which unobtrusively and gradually shaped policies and programmes and even reflected to us - was also along the same lines. As such, I did not shy away from opening it out with hope and doing all I can to make it a success. However, at this stage, it would be extremely optimistic - and even dangerous - to say that "the two sides are reaching an agreement". However, I strongly believe and I am of the impression that, sooner or later, this is the most suitable way of solving the problem among all else.

The last part of my defence is related to my personal situation. Perhaps there was not much of a need for it. However, I found it necessary for it completes the overall picture. To investigate in depth the search for a great freedom that also relates to my case, has become the methodology for me. I had to apply it to myself. A reply of this kind to the indictment would be very instructive. Here is what I observed: What characterizes [marks] my life is the motto of "Give me my freedom or give me death." Any other stance is unthinkable. However, to open its essence, to show its intricacies was very instructive. At this point, my greatest fear is the non-completion of this humanitarian project. Therefore, my greatest expectation from life is [to have a chance] to reach from an overly-competent character of a rebel for freedom to that of a struggler for peace which contains freedom. To analyse the character of a man of peace and that of a society of peace do require more than what is assumed, not only in terms of a political and social analysis, but also, a theoretical endeavour that requires a detailed psychological analysis. As I have emphasized, a war (or all kinds of violent actions) which do not aim at a noble, sacred and very necessary peace, is madness. In accordance with this rule [understanding], it was important that I should analyse in depth, not only the theoretical but also the moral, political and practical aspects of the character (in the Turkish text the literal word is personality) of the man of peace.

With such features, my defence lays bare in a remarkable and creative way the necessity of both, how the profound democratic stirrings Turkey is currently going through should become a fundamental attribute of the Republic and how the Kurdish question with its democratic spirit of unity, soul and will should unify at this historic stage with the Republic. My defense also emphasizes the need for change in our organization and in our people to incorporate the above transformations. Instead of the now classical kill - get killed cycle, [my defence advocates] that it is much better to live and let live as our modern times require. [My defence] concludes with the hope of a 21st Century that ushers in a new period of history which is possible only within the framework of a democratic republic, in democratic unity and its unparalleled power of solving problems, instead of the nearly two hundred-year -old tradition of the rebellion and the consequential suppression-and-denial policies of Turkey.

II - AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY: VICTORIOUS DEMOCRACY

Even though the roots of the democratic system go way back to the early history of humanity, it acquired a comprehensive meaning when it was incorporated into a state system in ancient Athens. Basically, democracy is the most realistic system that insures the most freedom for the individual while allowing society to exercise self-rule. It derives its real power from corresponding to the natural in society. Perhaps, authoritarian regimes bring about rapid development, but no matter how strong, sooner or later, they collapse because they alienate themselves from what is socially natural. Giant empires based on slavery, capitalist fascist totalitarian dictatorships and even the totalitarian real-socialism, all shared the same fate [due to this alienation].

The fact that democracy declared its total victory at the end of this Century, the century of astounding production and technology, is no coincidence. This is closely related to the [functional operation] of democratic system's mechanisms. No other system has managed to render the society and the individual this creativity in their own naturalness. The democratic system obtains its power from freeing people. Democracy is simple, but develops slowly. However, without a doubt, the results it bore in our times are more impressive and rapid than those a most powerful regime can afford. Democracies possess mostly an evolutionary language, but essentially, they rest on revolutions. The most crucial thing to know is when to democratize a revolution. Revolutions that fail to democratize might either lead to dictatorship or deteriorate into anarchism. Revolutions that succeed in democratizing life become permanent and manage to bring about creative development. To become stuck to a revolutionary stage is to become stuck to bureaucracy as much as to counter-revolution. It is this [principle] that constitutes the secret of past and present success of the mightiest societies that pursued successful democratization.

The theoretical - ideational dimension of today's democracies developed during the 17th-18th centuries. The institutional and administrative developments relating to democracy gained momentum starting with the mid-19th Century. During the 20th Century, democracy resisted the totalitarian, unforgiving dictatorship of fascism and its adversary, real-socialism. It was at the end of the century that democracy announced its final victory. The two totalitarian systems, although producing rapid (economic) development, collapsed because of excessive suppression of the freedom and creative abilities in the individual and in society. Coercion could produce rapid development, but also a rapid downfall. Whereas the democratic system develops slowly, but it does not collapse easily. This is because the individual and society would not easily let go of it. Democracy derives its power from this. Society's enlightenment of itself, that is, its acquisition of scientific power [understanding] is mostly related to its level of democracy. Likewise, it is no coincidence that scientific and artistic talent develops in societies that provide the most freedom.

Even with the collapse of the socialist system in the 1990s and its transformation into [some form of] democracy, the great advance of democracy is still in the making. In a way, the remnants of other systems will continuously exert a pressure on democracy and a pure version of it could, one way or another, not be established. However, [more and more democratization] will be the trend of the future. The crucial thing is to apply democratic values to solve social problems and to rule the society. The best politics or politician is the one that seeks its/his identity through the individual, the party and the leadership that represent power.

Generally speaking, societies where democracy is likely to flourish are the ones that -after manifesting their very sharp conflicts in the form of revolutionary explosions- choose to solve the rest of their problems (relating to conflicts in group's and individual's interests) through non-violent methods with the mediation of political parties and institutions. If and when a society matures to this degree, all it takes is to correctly identify the principles and institutions of democracy, and then, make them operational to solve existing problems. This requires creativity on the part of the political leaders and defines the democratic essence of political leadership.

The art of successful democratic politics requires the ability to correctly identify the interest groups, the nature of social conflicts and to balance the relations among them peacefully. It also includes the ability to handle power and the fall from the power.

The economic wealth of a nation or the lack of it cannot be the criteria for the practice of democracy. Democracy can be implemented in rich and poor countries alike. Perhaps the only condition that is required is to accomplish one or a few of the necessary revolutionary steps.

Democracy has little to do with political borders or with the existence of the state. Democratic systems do not deal with these issues. Democratic systems deal essentially with the interests, freedom and equality of the social groups and the individuals; and the rules and regulations that govern political institutions, governing, coming to power or losing power. National borders are a datum, a given. They are a framework within which policies are made and implemented. Coercion does harm democracy. Democratic politics does not relate to the existence of the state or its indivisibility. It relates intensely, though, to the forms of the state, how it handles social problems, its rules and regulations, how it selects and delineates political-moral values, the issue of representation and harmonious-peaceful transfer of power. The recognition of the rights and freedoms for those individuals and groups that lack them, and the incorporation of these actors into the system are also one of the essential political and moral requirements of democracy. As long as there are oppressed and powerless individuals and strata who lack basic freedom and rights, that democracy has major shortcomings. If conflicts and tensions are not solved peacefully, rebellions, civil wars, insurgencies and other revolutionary conflicts would break out and cause bloodshed, ushering in perhaps a new democratization process.

Democratic development in societies dominated by dogmatism, authoritarian principles and institutions, requires above all, a struggle with these hurdles. What feeds the authoritarian and the totalitarian regimes is such dogmatism and traditionalism.

Democracy has its own principles, institutions and traditions too. They are freedom, equality, lack of oppression, evolutionary development, respect for rights and responsibilities and consensual solutions. Democracy is closely related to scientific [objective] definition of the society and [the need for] its enlightenment. With such qualities, democracy is a wonderful way of creating mature, responsible individuals and social classes.

This comprehensive framework in which we have defined democracy, very clearly shows as to why democracy is both the cause and the outcome of scientific-technological developments and the enlightened society.

The failure of the suffocating totalitarianism of fascism and bourgeois nationalism, and the excessive egalitarian totalitarianism of the working class are related to having moved out of the democratic framework described above. It seems that the democratic system has insured its victory into the 2000s and cannot be stopped spreading in depth to all societies. It is certain that those who resist this [wave of democratization] will lose while those who implement it will surely win.

III TURKEY'S AGENDA FOR THE 2000s

Developments during the last 150 years of modern history that we have presented here in very broad outlines, point to the victory of democracy. This process of democratization could be successful in Turkey if very serious mistakes are avoided especially in democratically solving the Kurdish problem; if the Turkish left manages to transform itself into legal political parties and the Islamic movement assimilates democratic ideals.

The democratization of those who approach this process from a narrow, opportunistic and selfish motive cannot go beyond demagoguery. One must see in depth that Turkey is going through an important period that is qualitatively different. Recent history, while inheriting a heavily centralized feudal tradition that was devoid of democracy, has been stuck in a stage of producing no solutions as a result of devastating blows of the frequent coups and counter-coups, revolutions and counter-revolutions.

A very tense society that is resistant to democratic openings, state officials who have always viewed democracy with suspicion, intellectuals who have stood aloof to any struggle for democratic values, are all fundamental aspects of this problem. Truly, the Republic could have realised a lot less onerous path of democratization. The process [of democratization] in Turkey has been truly hard, as the same is true for other countries. Turkey failed to have a democratic system due to lack of conviction, serious efforts and a true understanding of democracy (as opposed to demagoguery). In the name of democracy, the demagoguery always ruled. That is, in the name of democracy - ism, a play was staged in an ugly way with an accompanying rhetoric that both concealed and served to vested interests. There could be no place for demagoguery any more. The process (period) we are going through right now will either lead to an enduring, truly democratic republic with its social milieu, institutions, administrative structure and real democratic ideals, or it will lead to the repetition of more of the same. The [Turkish] society has matured and is ready for democracy and its system of peacefully solving problems. Political parties [in Turkey] have learned their lessons to a great extent.

Dysfunctional institutions have been exposed. An effective administration would not fail to obtain the sustained support of the people. The military as the most ready institution is inclined to turn this process in favour of democratization, but at the same time, has no intention of relaxing its control of society.

As one of the most serious problems [of Turkey], if the Kurdish problem is solved in a way that incorporates the [Kurdish] guerrillas and the PKK in an appropriate democratic system that can solve the problem, it will be a permanent victory for democracy. The integration of Islam as represented by the RP/FP has already been accomplished to a good extent. Here is what awaits Turkey on the horizon: the, at least, two hundred year old effort toward westernization would finally bear its fruit. Violence embedded in society and the social structure that played an important role in moving the centuries forward [engine of change] will lose its meaning and be dumped to the dustbin of history. Not only violence has become unnecessary, but also, due to increasing apathy and stagnation of society, will not even be noticed. Even if society in Turkey has truly reached to some degree of maturity, political institutions and cadres have not yet set an effective and well-established pace of progress. This is where the trouble lies. Lack of any other alternative makes the democratic solution the only option.

The democratic option (alternative), as it is in other matters, is the only alternative in [solving] the Kurdish question. Separation is neither possible nor necessary. Kurdish interests are definitely best served in a democratic union with the whole of Turkey. If the democratic solution is fully implemented, it would become even a more successful and realistic model than autonomy and federation. Even at this very moment, developments are all pointing in this direction.

If Turkey solves its toughest problem in this manner, violence in all its forms, be it revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, military muscle flexing (such as under martial laws) or religious fanaticism, will rarely be an issue. A Western-style problem solving will considerably gain momentum. Then, economic resources, society's level of education, the non-demagogic administrative structure and loyalty to truly democratic values such as liberty, equality and justice, could make a great leap forward.

Even though similar approaches have been conceptualized in discussions on a Second Republic, we believe a democratic republic [envisioned in this defence] is a more correct approach. The 2000s [the new millennium] is imposing an evolution in this direction [toward a democratic republic], which, becomes more inevitable with every passing day. It is not hard to see that for those individuals, political parties and social groups that feel deeply about [the change], history is providing a chance to take a great leap forward, if they take the necessary steps. While the need is increasingly making this search [for peace and democratization] as the urgent item on the agenda in need of a solution, the absence of a leader [as an interlocutor for peace] is sorely missing. Distrust created by worn out politicians, lack of a complete understanding of the armed forces' role, the weakness of an evolutionary and fear of a revolutionary leadership, have all led to the current leadership crisis of the democratic system.

A short history and some fundamental characteristics of Turkish-Kurdish relations

The arrival of Turks - and in particular of Turkmens who broke away from their ruling elements - in the areas heavily populated by Kurds in the tenth century, led to the intermingling of the two peoples. The relatively more settled way of life of the Kurds led to the absorption of the Turkish tribes in these centuries. In political organization the Turks, and in social organization the Kurds were relatively dominant. While the Turkish upper strata in general took over the local political culture and achieved dominance, the lower orders on the whole were absorbed by the Kurds. The socio-economic and cultural and religious similarities between the two peoples play an important role in this intermingling. The feudal social structure is quite similar in both settled and nomadic tribes. Such, in brief, are the foundations of the brotherhood of the Turks and Kurds that is often alluded to.

When we look at history we see that, especially in the Seljuk Empire set up in Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Kurdish lands and later with the Mervanis, Artukogullaris, Ayyubis and the Akkoyunlus and Karakoyunlus, and many small states, the Turkish and Kurdish upper social strata and therefore the social orders under them share a common land and state. Rather than being in conflict with each other, they live in harmony in close proximity to one another. With no other nation - be it the Arabs, the Iranians, Armenians or Byzantines - is such a concept of a common state shared. This is how the Kurdish Turk or Turkish Kurd is born. It is important to bear this in mind as an outstanding characteristic in order to make sound objective assessments. It is important to have such a scientific approach to the brotherhood of Turks and Kurds.

We see a striking example of this phenomenon on a very high level in the Ottoman-Kurdish relations which begin with Selim I. Despite Selim's wish to the contrary, the dominant Kurdish lords chose not to set up a separate state, but felt their interest were better served by staying under the umbrella of the same state under a governor sent by the Sultan himself. This approach led to success against the saffevis of Iran in the battle of Caldiran and against the Arabic Mamluks in the battles of Ridaniye and Mercidabik. Under this arrangement, the Kurds continued to develop until the early nineteenth century. Their language and culture developed to a high degree. Only very rarely were there problems. This was largely due to the large measure of autonomy granted to the local governments under the umbrella of the common state, independent tribal structures, and the freedoms enjoyed in the fields of language and religion by all except the Alevis. What we see here is a multi-layered, rich experiment in government that can set us an example even today.

This system started falling apart in the nineteenth century as a result of the Empire's failure to compete with Western capitalism. The British Empire in particular entered into the region and the central authority upped its demands regarding taxation and military service; a process of rebellion was put in motion that continues to this day.

It is highly typical that, while the rebellions by all the other nations were successful, these rebellions failed despite being on such a large scale. The reason for this is once again the concept of a common land and a common state that is such a fundamental guiding principle. Some of the rebels were always on the side of the state. Breaking away is not what their outlook or policy is fundamentally about. They are more interested in securing advantages and concessions. Their attitude is one of "If you don't give it to me, I'll get in touch with this or that foreign power and rebel". This is not only the fundamental characteristic but also the misfortune and tragedy of Kurdish uprisings. It is an exaggeration even to look at these uprisings as progressive or reactionary, political or national. That is not their fundamental nature. That is more of a cover story. They are directed more by the self-interests of tribal leaders and by dynastic and family concerns, and they deepen the impasse, filling the history of the Kurdish people with suffering and massacres and leading not to progress but ruin. It is important to reassess these rebellions which have no philosophy, no political programme or organization, have two leaders even within the same tribe or family in every rebellion, seldom abide by military rules, and consequently always end up failing. Indeed their belief in success is practically non-existent. They are spontaneous and primitive. It is clear that it is not possible to reach anywhere on the basis of following whoever offers the most. This is where the tragedy and misfortune lie. One is tempted to say, "It would have been better if their history did not consist of these uprisings." This is once again the reason. Undoubtedly, the entry of imperialist forces, oppression by the central authority and increased demands regarding taxes and military service play an important role. But the most fundamental cause, as often mentioned in our day, is the notion of a common country, being one of the fundamental original elements of the state, assimilation between the two peoples, their having gone through many a war together, or, in other words, their being close to one another in destiny and joy, the dangers of separation, and their historical knowledge of all they stand to lose. These have led to a fundamental notion of togetherness. Even at the start of the twentieth century, when everything was being done to provoke nationalism, this notion was preserved and a successful war of national liberation was waged together.

The War of National Liberation and a new stage in Turkish-Kurdish relations

In both the last Parliament and at the meetings and congresses led by Mustafa Kemal at Amasya, Erzurum, Sivas and Ankara, national liberation was clearly seen as a joint liberation effort by Turks and Kurds. This was not only the right and practical path, but also the one demanded by the historical notion of a common country and state. To engage in separate, and especially opposed, struggles for liberation would have played into the hands of the "divide and rule" policy favoured by the imperialists of the day and especially by Great Britain. Here Mustafa Kemal's political outlook tested and developed by realities is clear and it is the only possible one. Without going overmuch into the theoretical reasons, he maintained unity virtually by ordering it, and that was what was needed at the time. This was so, because there were those on both sides who were working hard, with a good deal of help from the Sultan and Caliph, to cause a rift, and national liberation was a movement against these uprisings as much as against external enemies. What counts here is not intention but practice. Even within Parliament those in favour of the sultanate and the caliphate were quite powerful until 1924. Having to contend with these and also with the followers of the old Ottoman Union and Progress movement and with Bolshevik influences, the leading power had to follow intense and different tactics. Add to this the extensive claims of ethnic Greeks in the West emboldened by the Greek attack on Turkey, and equally extensive claims by the Armenians in the East, and it was obvious that national liberation had to be based on the two fundamental peoples, the Kurds and the Turks. If the two nations went their separate ways, and especially if they acted against each other, they would end up losing all they had. It is useful to explain some matters here which have not been gone into in depth: the national liberation movement was undoubtedly led by the Turkish side which was the one with the political and military experience and the developed national consciousness. Not only was this not opposed, it was expected. The Kurdish side found this natural and was not uncomfortable or anxious about being an auxiliary force under command. The notion of a common history, state, country and religion was fundamental here, and no one doubted that the struggle for national liberation would be waged together as well. Contrary to what has been maintained by some intellectuals, there was no question of deception or being deceived here. What was happening was the necessary outcome of natural togetherness. This was definitely the right strategy and it amounted to a unified tactical understanding. One has to admire Mustafa Kemal and those leading the movement. It is a mistake to think of the Kurdish side as collaborators during this period. They did the right thing, but suffered from an important lack of consciousness and organization as far as the negative developments that would occur in the future were concerned.

An important impasse would eventually develop on both sides on this point, when in fact the beginning was absolutely right and the successful national liberation struggle and the Republic proclaimed at the end of it are in fact a beautiful joint achievement. Indeed, at the press conference in Izmit - and it is important to bear in mind that this took place after the proclamation of the Republic - Mustafa Kemal gave a speech which can still offer guidance today, and in which he clearly states that Kurdish and similar problems can only be solved by the establishment of a democratic style.

Given the state of mixed areas and the insoluble problems likely to be caused by border changes, a type of local autonomy, the method employed today everywhere in the world in democracies and proposed by Mustafa Kemal, is once again the correct solution for this problem. However, because the caliphate and the sultanate had powerful support on both sides and because some primitive Kurdish intellectuals could not detach themselves from imperialism, could not share their programme with the Turkish Parliament under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and became narrow-minded separatists, they ended up participating in the uprising of 1925, even though they were not in any way ready for it. In fact, however, they did not have such an intention at the start. A large portion of them were state officials and army officers who supported the national liberation movement. Meanwhile, in the case of the local tribal and religious leaders, a combination of their ideological opposition to the Republic, the threatening of their material interests, and their relations with Istanbul and hence with the Allied powers was to drive them to the same wrong course in an untimely and unprepared manner. These were people who had supported the national liberation movement, believing it would result not in a republic but the restoration of the sultanate and the caliphate, when this did not happen, they rebelled. As will be seen from this, limited Kurdish nationalism was not a fundamental factor in the uprising. The uprising was a weak affair, without a programme, disorganized and leaderless. The masses and most of the upper-class intellectuals chose to support the Republic. This rift that occurred on the Kurdish side occurred in a more intense manner on the Turkish side.

There were more open exponents of the sultanate and the caliphate, the old Unionists were not happy with the Republic and as the Progressive Republican Party they represented the conservative wing and from time to time achieved a majority. During the uprising of 1925 Mustafa Kemal would objectively treat all these elements as a unified force with a common aim and firmly proceed to eliminate them. If one pays attention, it is clear that they are not seen as a special democratic group on the Turkish side and a Kurdish nationalist group on the Kurdish side. In any case, such a situation does not clearly arise. What is being debated is not the democratic nature of the Republic. Such a question is not on the agenda apart from the interjections of a few faint voices. The fundamental question is the protection of the Republic which is but a year-or-two-old. At least this is definitely so for Atatürk. He does not say, "I am crushing democrats and Kurds"; he says, "I am eliminating those opposed to the Republic." This might perhaps be a little extreme, but it is a realistic approach. Let us imagine one of the other two sides triumphing. Sultan Vahdettin was ready and waiting. In other words, what would have come was neither democracy nor an independent Kurdish state, but a sultanate collaborating with the British. This is the truth. There was no third way. The weak communist movement, which could not even save itself from being defeated by simple tactics, could hardly achieve power.

The triumph of the national liberation movement and of the Republic must therefore be seen as an historic common country and state for the two peoples. One cannot ascribe to Atatürk either a particular opposition to democracy or to Kurds. He was for progress and had expectations. The lack of intellectual depth, the absence of any experience of democracy, feelings of being under siege by domestic and foreign forces and of weakness; the reality of these things led to an authoritarian concept of the Republic at an early stage and render the concept of violence open to criticism. If Fethi Okyar, who can be seen as an unsuccessful liberal intellectual of the period - and who, it must be borne in mind, was a close friend and colleague of Atatürk's - had been successful, the Republic could have become more liberal and eventually more democratic. But the harsher and more bureaucratic premiership of Ismet Inonu, who was put in power by the uprising, played an important role in this authoritarian development.

Although influenced by Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, he nevertheless did not want to render the Republic founded by Ataturk authoritarian in the extreme. This can also be seen in the Free Party incident which is the second liberal experiment with Fethi Okyar. He was for a liberal development, but did not have the power to grasp the philosophical and social foundations this required. Subsequent Kurdish uprisings must be assessed along similar lines. Indeed, the traditional inability of the local powers to toe the general line, their traditional habit of doing as they pleased, and limited foreign influences, play a role, and this means that they had little chance of success against an increasingly powerful republic.

This is how the authoritarian republicanism of the Atatürk period appears within its concrete reality. It is a major error and injustice to blame the Republic and Atatürk for not moving in a more liberal-democratic direction and especially for Kurdish uprisings and the inability to produce anything more than these uprisings of a society which does not follow its national movement but - and exceptions do not change the rule - is led by scattered and disorganized local lords. Furthermore, it leads to the adoption of the wrong approach and leads to extremism, and this leads intellectuals, Islamicists, socialists and Kurdish nationalists to major errors of assessment, and indeed action. Had the claims that are made been true and had they had a material basis in that period, surely they would have achieved some success. Something that has a basis in reality will be successful. At most, this can be seen as an important historical experience both for democracy and the Kurdish question which is a part of it. It is hard to say it has yet been assessed properly. Those who do not assess history correctly will have great difficulty assessing the present and themselves correctly. This will often lead to failure, and where it leads to success, success will come about as a result of the chains of coincidences that are often encountered in social affairs.

The Kurdish ideological and political movements that fail to assess the founding of this Republic and its authoritarian development correctly end up creating by this means the fundamental reason for their tragedy and defeat. As an act of self-criticism it would be closer to the truth to express the real situation regarding this period as follows.

What should have been done was to accept unconditionally the Republic and the reality of a common country pertaining to it, then to seek democratic solutions for social problems including the Ataturk personality within this framework by discussing them in Parliament, forming groups where necessary and finding solutions which, without ever becoming reactionary or separatist, would carry the same republican and national unity principles, but in a more democratic way, to many social units. New parties and alliances should also have been tried, democracy should have been allowed to become widespread as in many European countries, and the republican revolutionary movement should have been taken forward through democratic evolutions to a democratic republic. This would have been the right solution and it still cannot be implemented today. The Democratic Party came to power by almost creating a democratic storm on the basis of the pressures exerted by the authoritarian republic and in general by two world wars. Or rather, by adding to the general power structure, land-owners and the expanding mercantile upper class, it transformed the character of the republic in the direction of an oligarchy. It was the suppressed feudal dignitaries of the East and the newly emerging land-owning bourgeoisie and the mercantile upper class of the West that became prominent during this period in the history of the Republic.

In this period, the Kurdish question manifests itself in the form of returning from exile after the period of suppressed uprisings, the binding of wounds, and a very weak ideological Kurdism. This is a very weak bourgeois-feudal Kurdism. They still have intellectuals, but their activities remain ideological. They do not seriously form parties, do not become a movement, and their ideological activities are not very scientific or comprehensive. They are some way behind even the state of affairs at the start of the century. Although, under the leadership of Barzani, they are influenced by and try to make use of the Turkish left, here, too, they fail to establish a structure with character. In brief, they stay considerably behind the uprisings of the feudal period and fail to transcend the classical collaborationist-cum-separatist stance of the dominant class. They fail to establish the correct definition of the Republic and the correct approach to it. The fearful and hollow criticism that is practised produces many a diseased personality. With the suppression practised during the period added to all this, a healthy Kurdish bourgeois national movement fails to materialise. Their failure to analyse from a Kurdish point of view the fact of the Republic being a fundamental element and to develop an approach which is not separatist but seeks equality and freedom pushes them into the old state of affairs where even the smallest criticism is seen as separatism. With the extreme accusations of extreme Turkish nationalism added to all this, the Kurdish Question, which is in fact a fundamental democratic problem, cannot as a rule even avoid being provoked. The branding of even a minimal democratic demand as separatism and treason led to its opposite, i.e. anti-democratic attitudes, becoming powerful as a result of the situation. Chauvinism and fascism grew strong. Even within the Turkish left this chauvinism was influential. The Kurdish movement which suffered physical elimination during the uprisings, could not save itself from ideological and political paralysis during this period. In fact it could not transcend its fundamental error. It could not come up with a successful democratic programme and an accompanying form of organization that would present the common country and state analysis and the rights which were not granted and remained missing in this context. If it had been able to explain in a scientific and convincing way the Turkish and political and national forces, and state that the country was unified and separation from the Republic was not an option; if it had adopted this method way back in the Atatürk period, the situation would have developed in the opposite direction, i.e. towards a democratic republic. Here, too, however, the fundamental responsibility rests with the upper social strata, the local lords and tribal leaders. The reactionary collaborationist and separatist and also undemocratic stance of this class born of its fundamental nature led the question into an impasse from the start despite a very important beginning, and gave rise to profound tragedies and losses.

Kurdish intellectuals always blame all this on the Republic. In reality, their failure to question their own fundamental, albeit class-based role in this, is the real reason the Kurdish Question has become intractable. The failure, despite an oligarchic struggle and a quite serious conflict between the right and the left during this period, even to pose the question correctly was to be influential in the emergence of the PKK.

The Emergence of the PKK and a New Stage in the Kurdish Question

The indictment of the Chief Prosecutor contains a picture of the PKK. Like all pictures, however, it is devoid of spirit. It is not enough to present the bill for an entire war and actions of a large scope. Again, to determine the objective on the basis of the initial programme and to demonstrate it with some extracts from speeches by the leadership without being influenced by the changes and transformations in the world during the last quarter of a century, might perhaps endow the indictment with meaning from the point of view of legal procedure, but it clearly cannot exactly express its political significance. There is an accusation of wanting to found a state, but who is going to found this state? If it is the people, what sort of historic and social reality do they have? Again, is it possible objectively, i.e. from a scientific point of view? Not to mention such matters at all will prevent it from being anything more than a subjective legal text heavy on accusation. Indeed, even from a legal point of view, it will only be one-sided in this state. We are of the opinion that to express the true nature of the PKK here in terms of theory, politics and action is a historic duty and it will supplement the indictment and provide a reply to it. We will not discuss its legal side in any detail. If there is an opportunity, perhaps some of our lawyers could go into that. How then should the PKK be approached?

The PKK is the last major Kurdish rebellion movement which was created and developed by an utopian theoretical group given to the study of the stormy revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements in the world, and which pursued ideological rebellion in the period from 1970 to 1980 and politics and action in the period from 1980 to 1990. It has taken major steps in uniting politics with the art of war, and is an unique liberation movement which, while Kurdish in form, is regional in character. It has presented the Kurdish Question in a way that transcends the classical approach to it, and is a Kurdish Question movement that is modern and democratic in terms of its social basis, objectives and tactics. In other words, as well as developing the Kurdish Question into maturity, it has, for the first time, brought to the solution the democratic style of working-class elements. It is a movement which is characterized by these factors. It has developed the question into maturity and rendered it highly capable of being solved by abandoning and rendering void the approach of traditional dynastic leaderships based of relying on outside powers and, in the event of finding no help from such a quarter, capitulating immediately. It has found its place on the stage of world history as a lasting movement which is based on free individuals and a free society and is thus both quite modern and capable of offering a genuine social solution. Until the 1990s it was concerned with proving the existence of the problem to Turkey and to the world and asking for a solution, and in the 1990s it progressed by having the solution placed on the agenda. While its inability to grasp the solution at the start of the 1990s resulted from lack of preparation, errors and lack of experience, from 1993 onwards it was in a period of difficulties and turmoil. It was indeed in this period in the 1990s that it should have transformed itself. Especially its failure to detect world-wide developments after 1993 and to be creative in terms of a solution can be seen as a defect. It repeated itself excessively in this period. Consequently, it moved away from its capability for a solution and caused the problem to worsen again. Undoubtedly, the derailment, on both sides, of the style of war it followed played an important role here. With misfortunes added to all this, the problem worsened. As we approach the year 2000, should the PKK manage to solve its contradictory position of both having to transcend itself and once again directing the problem towards a solution, it will have played its historic role. It can bring this about by transforming itself from a revolutionary organization into a democratic organization.

As far as the separatism-versus-union question is concerned, it is important to distinguish between two stages in the history of the PKK. During the process of its emergence, years of oppression and denial extending as far as the banning of the Kurdish language, the utopian approach based on simple slogans then dominant on the left, the separatism born of the fear and anxiety within Kurdish nationalism, and the perception on the part of national liberation movements all over the world that the only solution was a separate state, led to a heavy emphasis on separatism in the programme and propaganda of the PKK. There was often an emphasis on international unity, but the dominant side had broken away from the existing union brought about by force. We often compared this to a marriage brought about by force and said it could not last. In a sense, this was a valid approach. But answers had to be found as to what extent and in what way. This period extended as far as the nineties. Together with mass support, the need arose to transcend this period at about this time. In other words, the foundations were being laid for a free union. The lifting by the state of the language ban, the limited freedoms granted in the areas of language and culture, the acceptance of the problem by senior statesmen and their efforts to solve it, and finally my own cease fire approach in March 1993 clearly indicated a period when both sides were emphasizing a free union. After this point free union propaganda becomes dominant. From 1996 onwards our verbal and written responses to the indirect messages we received were openly based on the principle of "democratic union within the framework of the unity of the country and the independence of the state". This was due to a very large extent to both the state transcending its former harsh approach and it becoming clear that, in practice, separatism was not a realistic option and entailed too much pain and loss. Life was showing us more clearly every day what was true and a basis for union. Consequently, I regard it as a great defect that, in its indictment, the Office of the Chief Prosecutor regards this as a simple tactical manoeuvre and fails to assess it as an important transformation. The call for a democratic Republic and a democratic union must be seen as not only a piece of strategy but also a solution indicated to, and made inescapable for us, by the struggle itself.

The Role Played by Kurds in the History of the Republic, the Kurdish Question and Its Solution

The classical narrow legal approach is undoubtedly inadequate in terms of assessing and judging the PKK in the correct manner. Again, it cannot be presented correctly through the primitive separatist approach any more than it can through the traditional nationalist approach based on denial. If Turkey wants to get rid of this most important problem, she has to unearth the facts by applying the scientific standards of the historical and social approach to opt for a conciliatory solution. Assessments which do not take into account the social reality of the PKK and the existing political system, and which have got particularly subjective of late, can neither destroy the PKK nor attract it to a solution. If both sides soften the language used in their propaganda and adopt a more objective approach, the problem will slowly stop being intractable and it will be possible to take it towards a solution. Hardline ideological and political approaches are not in keeping with the need for a democratic solution that characterizes this period. If the Kurdish question is treated in the context of the Republic and a solution is sought, it will be seen that the PKK phenomenon is the most mature instrument for a solution. In historical terms it is very important to pose and answer some questions openly. Everyone now gives voice to these. If the Kurds are one of the founding members of the Republic - and they are - why did the displaying of their identity became the greatest problem in the period of founding and development? What are the historical errors committed by both sides? And in order to solve the problem it is now inevitable that Kurds should be scientifically redefined as one of the fundamental dynamic elements of founding and development, and they should also be defined as conscious free citizens and a social group of the Republic, and their share in the general constitutional rights and responsibilities should be indicated. If this is not done, the completely unscientific old method whereby everyone draws conclusions that suit their self-interests of the moment will become the dangerous basis of this matter. Some will use it to seek an undemocratic voter base, others will make it the target and subject of nationalism and others still will find in it grounds for rebellion. It is indisputable that, despite all its utopian and extreme political approaches, the PKK played an historic role by presenting the problem and the need for a solution in the most striking way and by making a solution necessary. Its methods, its hardline political approach and its confusion of being ideological with being political notwithstanding, it has no equal and it has left a large and rich legacy to history. In this sense, it has paid the highest price not only to have the existence of Kurds accepted but also to stop it being a problem. It has lost almost 25 thousand members, more than 10 thousand of its members have been sentenced to prison for almost 20 years, millions have been forced to move, it has suffered great hardship and made great sacrifices in the war, and more that 3,000 thousand villages belonging to the masses from it derives its strength from have been emptied. These facts not only indicate the source of the problem, they also indicate the fact that a solution must be found. If one adds to this the other side of the war, i.e. the losses suffered by the state, the dimensions of the problem and the overwhelming need for a solution will become apparent. The profound effects on domestic and foreign politics and the socio-economic structure and indeed the virtual deadlock that has developed in these areas make it still more necessary to find a solution.

In reality Turkey and the Republic have to a large extent become familiar with this aspect of the phenomenon. However, the heavy official rhetoric and the timid approach to finding a solution have turned into a problem. We must admit the following to ourselves. We have always lived with this phenomenon and we will continue to do so. That being the case, why not become known as an un-problematic, free, dynamic and democratic element of progress and become the power, the free democratic power of the Republic? Why balk at this? Why should the transformation of a founding element into a recognised element with democratic participation be against the constitution and the law? If anything is wrong, it is this constitution and these laws which are against the fundamental principles of the Republic. What needs to be changed is not the phenomenon but the laws that cannot express it adequately and in a democratic manner. This aspect of the laws has played an important role in the worsening of the problem. In fact this situation does not exist in the founding assembly of the Republic and in the Atatürk of the founding period. Here, notwithstanding its amateurish and utopian emergence and its errors as regards its methods of action, the PKK has rendered the Republic a genuine service by saying, "See and solve the problem that has troubled you for so long". In this sense, it has tried to play a role as important as that played by the Kurds as a liberated and founding nation in the history of the Republic: it has tried to play a role in its transformation into a democratic republic. With their rebellion in the form of the PKK the Kurds have proved the following: If you don't recognise our freedom, separatism and rebellion will always be on the agenda. Either I enter into a free union with you or I die or run away. This is what they have ended up saying. This is what the rebellion has expressed. The PKK has arrived at the nearest level of maturity for a free union. Seeing this is its history. Not to see this cannot be regarded as protecting the Republic and, above all, it cannot be regarded as defending it. To see the free union, which recently expressed itself through the millions of votes cast for the HADEP party and to take it to a democratic union with the legal system of the Republic is the correct way to defend the Republic. The PKK is a movement of consciousness and free will that has shown that union cannot be achieved through the suppressed and frightened reality of the Kurds which ignorance has rendered almost unrecognizable, that the existence of such a group is not compatible with the enlightenment to be associated with the Republic, and that, if the Republic stands for enlightenment and freedom, it has to have these qualities for its founding member as well. The last elections have demonstrated this clearly. In this sense, the PKK is the historical reality of the correct definition and free union which are the rights of the Kurdish people under the Republic. If this historical reality is fully successful, it needs to be said in the last section of the indictment not that the PKK calls for a separate state, but that it very clearly calls for a democratic republic and is the founding force for such a republic. History may not state this clearly today, but sooner or later it will do so. With the PKK, history is unearthed, corrected and also provided with a solution. Just as the Kurds were among the National Forces during the struggle for national liberation in the 1920s, as we approach the year 2000, they have been a democratic force with the PKK, with all the correct and incorrect actions, and all the suffering and happiness that entails. This is not separatism but perhaps a move for the greatest union with Turkey and the Turks, a move towards strength and once again becoming a leader in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. There is no way of achieving this other than through a free union. The PKK has also served to prove this. Nothing can be more powerful than reality and this is especially true for laws. To be not for separatism but for union at this historic crossroads regarding the PKK it is necessary to see and define this dominant aspect of reality.

Transformation Problems within the PKK

It is a striking fact that towards the end of the twentieth century social and political systems have undergone major changes and transformations and those resisting these changes and transformations have not been very successful. Essentially, systems which cannot answer the needs of individuals who have become free as a result of the scientific-technological revolution are under great stress. No matter how they try to patch things up, they are in difficulties, and regardless of their attempts at suppression changes are taking place on a level and with a speed not encountered in any other period. It is as if we are experiencing the social and political repercussions of the atomic age. Socialism, which represented the highest stage of democratic progress and its most egalitarian and free expression at the start of the century, and which, beginning with the upheaval in Russia, went on to exert considerable pressure on capitalism which was evolving towards a single system, has virtually died though shortness of breath. This of course happened because, like many systems, socialism was rigid, and because it could not open channels within the system to the freedom and equality that are part of its essence, and it failed to carry forward to the people the positive developments in both the economic and the political fields experienced and partly carried forward to people even under capitalism, it brought about its own downfall. Its experience of a type of intense sectarianism also encountered in religions was also a factor here. This of course does not mean that socialism left no positive legacy. The historic role it played in bringing about the social and national institutions that characterize our age and in the emergence of classes and nations enjoying a greater degree of equality cannot be disputed. What capitalism had achieved in only a limited way over several centuries, socialism exceeded in half a century. Its inability to provide a solution to the heavy global crises, in which capitalism played the fundamental role, is not entirely its fault. However, because it was held responsible for finding a solution, it either had to find one or go under. Because it did not find a solution, it went under. This is a development often seen in history. There is no doubt that it will flower again on its roots. Again it is inevitable that, regarding the basic human problems, socialism, i.e. scientific socialism as the expression of the solving of social reality by science, will flower again. It will form the antithesis to the thesis posed by contemporary capitalism with its great inequalities and especially its inability to cope with history, with nature and with many social problems. The socialist experiment, which has left a great experience behind it, will form a synthesis between its achievements and what it has to achieve. Especially in the areas of nature and the environment, women, children and population, history and culture, ethnic and religious minorities and the solution national situations and social imbalances will it be effective. It will achieve this by renewing its theories and combining this with the right practice. It will reach its period of maturity and renew itself by adding to the democracy that led to its downfall everything from the ways in which even capitalism can be used to the aforementioned ethnic and cultural groups, so as to reach its broadest democratic system. Just as capitalism incorporated the achievements of socialism into its own democracy, even allowing the founding of Communist parties and paying more attention to the human rights at the roots of socialism than socialism itself, and thereby outstripping socialism, the new socialism will incorporate all the values of not only capitalism but also all human history. It will face the dangers before humanity and reach its great potential for offering a solution. Those who respond in time to this law of evolution of the social dialectic will enjoy development, while those who do not will only suffer pain and be left under the wreckage of meaningless losses. In the context of the social transformations we are undergoing at an intense rate in our day, we see the application, virtually under laboratory conditions, of some law in some corner of the world every day.

Not to draw a conclusion from this is possible only if one is blind or extremely conservative. Even if change and transformation extend over the entire century in Turkey, which is one of the focal points where these general changes are experienced in an intense manner, it would be true to say that, in the social sense, they have occurred to a greater extent during the last thirty or forty years experienced by our generation. This has involved socialism, the main ideology that had an impact on the period, and right-wing and religious ideologies that were struggling against it. The transfer of socialism to Turkey was conducted in a more eclectic, slavish and schematic manner than that of capitalism. Domestic social thinking was at a low level of development and dogmatic. It was thought that, instead of identifying and analyzing social characteristics, it would be sufficient to apply socialism in an schematic manner to achieve progress. Socialists were prey to vapid generalizations and were slipshod in practice. It might be enough to say "There is no god but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet" to become a Moslem. Such an act might be important and significant in the context of its day, but socialism in Turkey in the 1970s was even more of a mechanical exercise and even more irresponsible. Socialists did not have an approach befitting the seriousness of their ideology. It bore a close resemblance to that "false belief" that believed easily and abandoned its beliefs when to do so suited its interests. In other words, a false faction was in existence. This was a degenerate style that dominated in general. Socialism was also partly just a fashion. In the superstructure, in the adherence to the official ideology, too, the same style obtained. Consequently, not only was the healthy form for social change, that is the main change needed in the period, not found, but things ended up in chaos. The chance to establish a democratic movement that would have provided the most results historically was lost, and extreme violence caused a reaction on the part of society at large. Inevitably, the classical right and conservative trends gained ground. Once again the law that states "if you can't pose the right solution, you will go under" applied. The left, which espoused change, was unable to transcend its empty slogans and demagogical stance. The right was incapable of bringing about change. With the army exercising its traditional balancing function, these years were lost in a routine but very painful way along with the loss of many chance of development.

Although the PKK was born amid the whirlpool of these turbulent years, the open wound of Turkey and its all-too-obvious contradictions meant that this organization did not have much difficulty in grasping the Kurdish Question and partly solving it in a manner that was nearly right. Consequently, it developed rapidly. Contrary to the claims made by some, this was not fundamentally due to violence. It was connected with that, but also with the level of social contradictions. This is like picking a ripe fruit on the principle of "Strike and it'll drop". Here the belief of the leader and the fulfillment of the requirements based on certain fundamental truths were enough for a start. It was especially easy to outstrip similar groups, cross official and unofficial barriers and to be striking with the very first actions undertaken by the organization. Even an amateurish approach was sufficient. Even a decade was too much time to surpass similar groups, the ideologies of the system and feudal barriers. By the time the 1980s were reached, the system had been transcended both feudally on the local level and officially on the general level. It was clear that ideological and political systems and barriers could no longer be a deterrent. This rested on the power of a socialism that was not understood in any depth and of Kurdish consciousness of history and society which were once again poorly examined and superficial. In other words, these were enough for an amateur movement. This is essentially how the development up to the 1980s can be explained. Only the army could stop this development, and indeed that was what happened. There was, however, a partial response to this in the form of the refuge found in the Middle East and the situation was partly transcended. This was how the army's traditional method of suppression was transcended by the time we arrived at the 1990s. Of course this did not amount to the defeat of the army. It was only a striking proof that the classical method of suppression of the army could be transcended, perhaps for the first time in history.

The response to this by the army and the state was the recognition of the Kurdish problem and the acceptance of a limited solution in official quarters. This was indeed an historic development. In the context of the realities of Turkey it was the ultimate point to arrive at, no matter how much one fought beforehand. The Kurdish reality whose main features as a founding element of the Turkish Republic were neglected, and which was suppressed and frightened into submission following its uprisings, allowed to stay backward and ignorant, and further distorted by the feudal style, had turned into an ugly monster, was recognised. On the founding of a new government, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel said at Diyarbakir, "We recognise the Kurdish reality". The same point was made in a more comprehensive manner by President Ozal and became the first item on the agenda for all official and unofficial parties and milieus. This shows that there was a chance of solution. However, everyone was really unprepared and amateurish. The problem was a big one, but approaches to it were superficial. This was true of the PKK as well. A partial cease fire was a bold move, but the parties did not have the necessary depth and preparation. With the traditional rebellious stance being dominant on the part of the PKK and the traditional suppressive stance being dominant on the part of the state, the chance of an historic solution was missed. Needless to say, opportunist politicians, provocations and the influence of outside powers played no small role here.

In reality, during this period the state was undergoing serious changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union and developments that genuinely affected Turkey in the aftermath of the Gulf War made it vital to find a solution for the Kurdish problem, and the route that would lead to this lay through a belated comprehensive democratization. Here the PKK put up a resistance. It resisted by excessively repeating itself instead of developing itself. It thought this was the only solution. In reality, from the collapse of the socialist system it should have deduced a democratic solution. It should have seen that the principle of "self-determination of nations" was no longer valid, that scientific-technical developments had undermined the concept of the nation state produced by the developments from the seventeenth century onwards, that a solution based on developing democracy within the existing borders without altering these borders in any way was more realistic. To put it briefly, it should have abandoned its programme dating from the 1970s and embarked on a new programme. It should have analysed Turkey again, taking into account the development the country had undergone both when it was being founded and in the 1990s, and it should have based its programme on these new developments. Socialist systems were collapsing all over the world, the Soviet Union was falling apart, and a blind and lame democracy was being looked to for a solution.

The PKK should have drawn important conclusions from this. Instead of espousing being a separate parts and a separate state, something that did not transcend an ideologically utopian rhetoric; instead of calling for being a separate part of a state, something which, in the context of the fundamental geography of the common motherland, would have been very difficult to realise - and, if realised, could not be maintained and was not necessary either. It should have opted for a democratic society within the same borders, the trend all over the world. It should have clearly seen and shown the free union of Kurds with the Republic. Especially with extreme intermingling, intense assimilation, and half the population being in a different geographical region, the solution to be arrived at and preferred was a deeper democracy. It should have found the language for this and, instead of the violence which got ever more degenerate and led to great pain and losses, should have moved towards a line of action that concentrated political-democratic activity. It should have acted in an expert and responsible manner and ended the war that was steadily getting dirtier. It should have seen that even continuous guerrilla activity against the army could play no other role than eventually arriving at the same solution and should have placed a controlled transformation into a political-legal alternative on its agenda.

After 1993, instead of insisting on guerrilla warfare and repeating this, it should have laid the ground work for this alternative. However much one may blame the cliques in government and the losses suffered by the guerrillas, the PKK should have seen the changes in both the world at large and the state at the start of the 1990s and come up with a response. Although it sensed this and felt the need for it, lack of experience and fear played an important role in preventing it. The PKK was not defeated during this period, but nor did it develop, because it was difficult to advance very far in its existing state under those conditions. This is the PKK's failure to see, to find a solution and to save itself from repetition. The Vth and VIth Congresses thus ended up becoming congresses of repetition in this sense. It will be seen from this that the PKK is genuinely at a major crossroads and it will either harden its traditional line further and continue its existence with the help of extensive domestic and foreign resources, or it will give up armed struggle on the basis of certain legal assurances, will make the unity of Turkey the basis of its programme and turn itself into an organization that is based on transforming a better understood Kurdish society through political-legal action and organization. This is definitely the historical stage that has been arrived at. This transformation, far from being seen as a renegade act or elimination, should be seen as a truly revolutionary transformation.

The alternative, i.e. the failure to achieve a transformation in the approach and nature of the organization, will lead to extreme conservatism and eventually elimination. Or, like similar organization, this, too, will descend into a hardline sectarianism. This reality, which is fundamentally experienced within the PKK but not formulated, clearly displays its need for transformation. To achieve a solution it is necessary not only to see the problem but also to prevent repetition as soon as possible, to prevent the loss of force and, without allowing disintegration, to move slowly with a common will from guerrilla warfare to an assurance-backed solution based on a democratic Turkey and towards the political-legal process and its line of action. Contrary to what is thought, this is not connected with the leadership but is a problem and a solution that goes considerably beyond the leadership and has considerable depth. The leadership at most speeds up the process. In many processes the leadership has in fact played a similar role. It is highly important to grasp this particular situation properly. Undoubtedly, it would have been healthier under free conditions. However, correct solutions demand and maintain their validity even if individuals are in captivity or in their graves. What is of defining importance here is the fundamental stage and the correct expressing of it and its need for a solution. Undoubtedly, the position of individuals, and especially, with the PKK, the position of the leadership, plays a defining role. If it has played a fundamental role, the leadership will last for a long time and its ability to offer solutions and its influence and power will continue. This is essentially how we can express the transformation problem within the PKK and its main platform.

How things will develop in practice in the long process before us depends on numerous factors; what we have to do is to foresee things and not allow ourselves to be caught in an unprepared state. At this stage in its history, the PKK should behave in a mature and self-confident manner while setting a new course for itself. It should not fail to see that self-examination and the identification of fundamental errors and mistakes is a necessity for a major organization and movement, and failure to do this in time betokens, on the contrary, the weakness of an organization. Some changes finish one off, others create history. To keep walking in the same way, repeating oneself all the time may tire one out, but, like a horse used to turn a wheel drawing water from a well, one will walk in circles and cover no real distance. The loss of creativity in the revolutionary struggle and the conservatism that comes with it must ultimately be transcended. Life will not tolerate those who stand outside it for long. A force that does not take life further turns into an obstacle, and life itself becomes the revolutionary reality and transcends the obstacles in its way. Sectarianism is living life in a twisted way. The PKK has undoubtedly not descended into this. It can comfortably stay on its traditional path and the gains that will accrue from this cannot be despised. However, it is clear that this cannot be achieved through simple confidence and established methods, but through the finding of the solution sooner or later.

Briefly, to reassess principles, the programme and the mode of action - this is as necessary as not to have done so despite the fact nearly a quarter of a century has passed - is dangerous. To achieve progress it is essential to examine with weary eyes a major practical experience, and especially one that was undergone under the most backward social, national and international conditions in the form of a highly unusual rebellion-war. Not to do this will put one under a heavy responsibility before history. It does not matter if some criticize this; what matters is being able to respond to the requirements of the historical moment. Some do not want to

see this, others see it but do not want to believe it. But what is correct and new always starts in this way. The picture of the PKK in the indictment will of course not change. A picture can only suffer erosion and become vague. However. the PKK is the free life not only of this nation but of a new humanity. The fact that it gave birth to itself by force does not mean that that is the way it is going to grow up. A child, too, comes into this world through a difficult birth, but then its natural development takes place without any difficulty. This is a law of nature. Qualitative leaps force things, but it is quantitative development that is fundamental. Why should it be wrong to apply this to human life and the life of an organization as well? If everything ended the way it began or stayed the way it was, there would not only be no development but such a state of affairs would be contrary to the laws of nature as well. Especially if great resistance and force is being experienced in a phenomenon, it will either decay or renew itself and reach a new stage of development.

These dialectical truths indicate that the picture painted of the PKK in the indictment fails to establish a connection with its living reality. This might be sufficient to condemn it, but it will achieve nothing further than making social problems worse. As many examples in history indicate, to convict such a movement that has posed such a danger to the state, has exacted such a heavy toll in its war, has had an effect on so many political developments on a daily basis, has exerted pressure on more than ten governments and rendered them unsuccessful, on the basis of laws which are a long way behind social practice, is an example of great conservatism and will deprive the state of the reform it has to undergo and society of an important opportunity for democratization. The right thing would have been not only to accuse, not only to point out what is right, but also to show how it could be achieved. The indictment has not been able to make good use of this opportunity, and it fails to transcend a traditional, one-sided and entirely negative condemnation. Both for the Republic and the PKK there is an historic environment and opportunity of conciliation as regards democracy in general and the Kurdish problem that lies at its roots in particular. If the Republic were to act maturely and see that democratization would not be a loss but a gain and stop insisting, and if the PKK could see that to transform itself it must opt for conciliation with regard to the Republic and historical conciliation can only be achieved in this way, and if it were to take steps in this direction, there would be an enormous leap when the democratization obtaining in society came together with a democratization with the same frequency on the part of the Republic. Old laws are undoubtedly a major obstacle to this. New laws, on the other hand, will clear the obstacles, and the obstacles before the laws themselves will be cleared by political will.

In the PKK trial, the indictment and the defence have a chance of winning in a big way only by not dealing in opposites like greater/lesser and less guilty/more guilty and being magnanimous enough to use the wonderfully subtle creativity of politics to meet in this historic valley of conciliation, break the ice between them and end their estrangement. A new synthesis will be born out of the thesis and the antithesis. The State-PKK opposition will lead to the synthesis of a Democratic Republic and will be a victory. Life does not progress without contradictions, and, as stated by many official representatives of the Republic, in this greatest event, rebellion and conflict in its history, the Republic must choose not to strangle but to progress by resolving the contradiction. Nothing can be gained by strangling a baby that has been born in one's own bosom. But if the baby is allowed to lead its life and treated as one's own, it will add to one's strength, and this time round history will not end bitterly but move towards the peace which is demanded by the democratic world at large and has become the greatest need of this society, the great contradiction will have been transcended and the path to strength will lie open. The trial of the PKK in the person of its leader has this potential. If the judges in the court see the deep social reality under this trial, if they look at the history of democracy, and if they assess the laws, which they know very well but which have become an obstacle before society, together with these, they will be able to reach their historic verdict in a more objective manner. If they reach a verdict by considering not legal formalities but the essence of society, if they bear in mind not the present moment but the recent past and the near future, and if they make room for the historic approach that has often been seen in the history of justice, this will be an opportunity for the Republic. The PKK will change from allegedly being a force working to break up the Republic into one of the primary sources of its strength. The judges must be able to see this. It is an historic duty not to turn into a convict and opponent of the Republic a movement that has lost nearly twenty-five thousand of its members, has more than ten thousand members in prison, and has received one and a half million votes in the last elections. Even if it has its faults and errors, what is going on is, as is often officially expressed at middle levels, a war. Every war is followed by a peace, and if the state opens the door to peace, albeit in a limited way, it will be seen that the PKK is strong enough to treat the Republic with the respect it deserves. Otherwise, both sides will lose, our enemies will win, suffering will increase, and history will be the loser. What is expected from this trial is a verdict that will enable history to win sooner or later.

In conclusion, the PKK must bear in mind the great changes of the last quarter of a century and especially the actual change in the democratic structure of the Republic brought about by the Kurdish Question, and also bear in mind the legal system that is under pressure, and make in its programme and principles the changes that are expected from it and are rendered necessary in numerous ways by these changes. It should develop a political programme based on the concepts of a democratic Republic and a common country, giving up the demands of the utopian period which are no longer the only form freedom can take and, in any case, no longer work and have been abandoned, and opting instead for the notion of free union; and it should render this programme official at a conference as soon as possible. Both sides can transcend the impasse only in this way. At a time when it is clear that the Republic has entered into a period of great democratization as regards its social and ideological foundations, the PKK must abandon its programme influenced to a large extent by the socialist systems of the 1970s and a dogmatic approach to the reality of Kurdish-Turkish relations, and reach a programme of democratic politics in Turkey as a whole and, on a deeper and more detailed level, in Kurdish society itself. This will open the path to political-legal development and make it possible to transcend the impasse.

It is clear that in many countries problems, which in some cases had continued for centuries, have been solved by a softening of approach of this type, and the European democratic system is full of examples of this process. To insist on sticking to old ways is to insist on maintaining the impasse. Principles and programmes have a value if they exist to take life further. If they are making life difficult, changing them in keeping with concrete realities does not betoken a lack of belief or self-denial, but is a necessity. For such a great struggle not to make the necessary changes in its principles and programme is conservatism and dogmatism. Life is always on the side of principles and programmes that take it further. Whoever puts up a resistance against this will lose.

The PKK's Action Structure

The Chief Prosecutor's Office states that they cannot present the entire reality as regards the PKK's action structure and, by selecting some acts, tries to make the PKK responsible for the cruel side of the rebellion and to strengthen the accusation of terrorism. However, from the start to this present day many top civilian and military officials have referred to the phenomenon as a rebellion and indeed the 28th rebellion, have spoken of it in veiled terms as a guerrilla war or, more scientifically, a war of medium or "low intensity"; and this is in fact the truth. Many books have been written on this subject and it has been explained scientifically. Although the phenomenon has many features that are unique to it, it is the common view of all leading experts that, of the many semi-rebellions and guerrilla wars, this is the most important one in the last quarter of the century. It is known that, the view it expresses for propaganda purposes notwithstanding, this is also the real view of the General Staff.

Consequently, if we abandon the language of propaganda and look at the action structure objectively, it is clear that a conflict involving a great deal of suffering and heavy losses on both sides, has claimed the lives of 5,000 members of the security forces according to the official figure, and of 20,000 members of the PKK, along with the 15,000 civilians killed on top of this, amounting to combined death toll of 40,000, has led to more than 3,000 villages being evacuated and caused more than 3 million people to be displaced, has involved the use of all types of aircraft, heavy artillery and tanks, and has at times led to 40 or 50 thousand army personnel being involved in operations lasting weeks, cannot simply be called a war against terrorism. It can only be scientifically designated as war. In terms of the time it has taken, too, it is a comprehensive war that has lasted for 15 years. A conflict such as this of course has not only extremely important historical and social grounds but also political goals. The two sides express this every day through their propaganda. Consequently, the narrow label of "terrorism" is hardly adequate to describe the phenomenon. To define it as free war or rebellion would not only be more scientific but would also be the way to move towards the best solution. There have been many similar and different wars in history, but all of them have always ended with the restoration of peace and, in cases where this was unilateral peace, there have been various agreements until the restoration of a mutually agreed peace. They have given rise to very important social and political consequences leading to both development and regression. The most important question that needs to be asked here is what should be the best solution or best type of peace for this war. With this style of war the PKK has brought about a change in the Kurdish revolutionary tradition and shown that, rather than relying on a particular tribe or tribal leader or this or that foreign power in the traditional way, it can continue to exist on the basis of its own resources. However, it has become clear that the political formation expressed by the PKK as the ultimate goal of its programme is neither realistic nor necessary. Meanwhile, the state has seen that, in the conditions under which the war arose, it is pointless to deny the Kurdish reality, language and culture and, acknowledging this de facto and indeed de jure, has arrived at the point of agreeing to a solution leading to democratic development.

The reality of the 1990s showed that, following the perception of these truths, the war was moving towards peace. A meaningful peace was on the agenda in those years. It is extremely sad that it has not happened. If another decade passes, the point that is arrived at will still be the peace demanded by these actual conditions. The coming of the peace in conditions where society is becoming democratic and the state is responding to this positively is also the expression of an historic moment, and for the first time there is a chance that democratic conciliation will lead to this last rebellion being indeed the very last rebellion. To find the legal language for this is the fundamental problem of our age. Without being emotional and without seeing either the Republic or the PKK as an obstacle, the conflict must be viewed as a very sad one born of injustice and negligence between brothers, and a joint, brotherly move must be made towards the main reality, a peace under the democratic umbrella of the Republic. Serious accusations and demands for capitulation or a fight until the last member is killed can only increase suffering.

In brief, to view the action structure in this way would be both more scientific and lead to an approach that wins and develops the future. If this is not done, the foundations of new rebellions will be laid as was done in the past. The most fundamental conclusion to be drawn from the dates of wars, the dates of Kurdish uprisings, should be that we must find a way of establishing a social foundation that will prevent such wars in the future and will not even give rise to isolated actions. Undoubtedly, this social foundation and the solutions related to it, can only be found through peace, the only valid democratic path. If society is presented with the democratic mode of expression, if this is made convincing through democratic channels and democratic action, and if the state is tolerant towards all this, the necessity for rebellion and action will disappear. As there is now a strong chance of solving the Kurdish Question, the significance of this war should be that it has demonstrated that it need not occur again; this last rebellion should be treated as indeed the last rebellion in history, and this should also be the legal interpretation of, and the legal verdict, on the matter.

The Biggest Problem in the History of the Republic Must be Solved Democratically

The most regrettable aspect of the Chief Prosecutor's indictment is its refusal to refer by name to the Kurds who have been the biggest problem in the history of the Republic, are recognised as such by all leading politicians and military figures, and are accepted today as founding members of the Republic. This is a very backward approach based on denial and could have dangerous consequences. It would therefore be useful to indicate here through extensive quotation how the Kurds were viewed by Atatürk during the period of the founding of the Republic. To agree at least on these words by Atatürk would keep the opportunity for a solution on a reasonable level for everyone. These are the words that clearly express that Kurds were one of the pillars of the Republic that was the outcome of the victory in the struggle for national liberation. The following are Atatürk's instructions of June 1920 to Nihat Pasha, the commander at El Cezire, laying the foundations of Atatürk's policy with respect to the Kurds and Kurdistan:

"The Instructions of the Council of Ministers of the Grand Parliament of Turkey to the Commander of the El Cezire Front Regarding Kurdistan

1- It is a part of our domestic policy that throughout the country local administrations should be set up in which the masses are directly involved and influential. In Kurdish areas the setting up of a local administration throughout is necessary not only for our domestic policy but also our foreign policy.

2- The self-determination of nations is a principle accepted throughout the world. We, too, have accepted this principle. It is assumed that by now the Kurds have made their preparations for local administration, and their leaders and prominent personalities have been won over to our side for this cause, and when the time comes for them to express their wish, they will indicate that they are in charge of their own destiny and want to live under the will of the Turkish Parliament. It is up to the Commander of the El Cezire Front to see that all the work in Kurdistan is directed at the policy based on this goal.

3- General principles have been accepted such as driving the enmity between the Kurds and the French and especially between the Kurds and the British along the Iraqi border to a level where it cannot be resolved through armed conflicting, preventing any alliance between the Kurds and foreigners, explaining the reasons for setting up local administrations throughout the country and thus making sure they are genuinely won over to our side, and giving Kurdish chiefs civilian and military posts."

Mustafa Kemal, Leader of the Grand Parliament of Turkey

In this set of instructions, the principal points of which are quoted above, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk recognises Kurds and Kurdistan at the very start of the national war for liberation, and, because the Republic was not then yet in existence and the Grand Parliament of Turkey existed instead, says they should rule themselves under the Parliament. This is the very phenomenon of local administration that is still being asked for. It is a kind of democratic autonomy. The indictment states that Kurds are not recognised and this is what makes the problem worse. The solution will come through recognition. And now let us look at Atatürk's approach to the matter after the founding of the Republic. This is very similar to his initial approach and is more analytical. It is to be found in his answer to the question posed by Ahmet Emin Yalman at the Izmir Press Conference, and this answer was repeated at Eskisehir. This is what M. K. Atatürk says:

"The Kurdish question cannot be raised because of the interests of local Turks. Because, as you know, the Kurds within our national borders are settled in such a way that only in a very few areas there is a concentration of Kurds. Elsewhere, they are dispersed throughout the Turkish population and this has led to the development of such a border that if one wanted to draw a border separating the Kurds, one would have to devastate Turkey. There would have to be a border that went as far as, say, Erzurum, Erzincan, Sivas or Harput. Indeed, one must not forget the Kurdish tribes in the deserts of Konya. Therefore, instead of imagining a separate Kurdish nation, it is better to abide by our Constitution, under which a kind of local autonomy will in any case form. This means that in those provinces with a Kurdish population they will enjoy autonomy. Furthermore, as far as the Turks are concerned, it is necessary to give voice to their existence as well. If this is not done, it is only to be expected that they will regard this as a problem. The Grand Parliament of Turkey consists of both Kurdish and Turkish deputies, and the Kurds and the Turks, these two elements have united their interests and destinies. It would not be right to attempt to draw a border between them."

It is possible to find many similar passages. This can never be denied. However, when the problem developed in a dangerous way in the wake of subsequent rebellions, this approach was abandoned. What must always be borne in mind are the facts that Kurds and Turks are intermingled, their destinies are united, and drawing a border separating them would lead to ruin. But a solution was not developed. There is no denial here, but the complexity of the problem, the internal relations with the sultanate and the caliphate and the external ones with Britain led to suspicion, and the opportunity of finding a positive solution was lost. When the Kurds failed to unite within the Republic, mainly because of ideological reasons and their leaders, separatism brought about repression. The spirit that had obtained at the beginning was damaged. Estrangement and suspicion developed between the Kurds and the Turks, two elements which could not in fact do without one another. The possibility of the exploitation of the problem by foreign powers made it even more insoluble. That was the way the period ended, but the problem was to keep coming up.

It is clear that Kurds participated as founding members in the national struggle for liberation and the founding of the Republic and they are not together with Turks, it will be as if the Turkish nation has lost a foot and become lame. This has been proven again and again at all the important points in Turkish history, at the battles of Malazgirt and Caldiran. The united destiny of the two peoples and the brotherhood between them is the outcome of this history. The history or rebellion should not allow us to forget this. In any case, the rebellions were mainly a struggle for dominance between the central authority and Kurdish feudal lords. It is well known that the latter were not really acting out of nationalist fervour but were interested in achieving local dominance for their tribe and furthering its interests. It is also a historical fact that they moved over to the side of whoever supported these interests. The Kurdish problem is encountered mainly as a tribal problem, i.e. a problem born of a culturally and socio-economically backward social structure. Especially in the course of the history of the Republic, the narrowly nationalistic and separatist unscientific approach adopted by both sides has raised the problem to dangerous levels and made a solution difficult.

There are in fact approaches that almost amount to a solution during the period of the national struggle for liberation and the founding of the Republic. As indicated by the passages quoted above, the approaches adopted by Atatürk during the period prove this, as do the waging of the national struggle for liberation and the founding of the Republic together on the basis of a common war and a common country. A further proof is the way deputies are allowed to wear their national costumes and use their national language in the Grand Parliament of Turkey. Even the Kocgiri rebellion ended with an amnesty and conciliation during this period. A hardline approach did not find favour in the Grand Parliament. This is very evident in the Nurettin Pasha incident. If this had been continued, the problem would not have got worse in that period, would not have weakened the Republic, and would not have had such a heavy cost. Here the main problem consists of establishing links with the sultanate and the caliphate before the Republic has really reached the East, the Kurds and all of Turkey. There is also the refusal to give up local authority. These are the consequences of the rebellions in this period, and they led to conflict and suppression. The conclusion that must be drawn from this is not that the existence of problems should be denied but that the correct solution must be found for them. And the correct solution is that democratization which, while not much in evidence between the two world wars, has been moving forward at a great rate since the Second World War. In this sense, Turkey's great problem is her inability to wage a successful war for democracy and to develop democratic standards. The reason why, despite many developments, both capitalist and socialist authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have collapsed is that they were structures out of keeping with this development. In our day all rigid systems are experiencing a major collapse and transformation in their superstructures and moving towards a democratic evolution. All national, cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic and indeed regional problems are being solved by granting and applying the broadest democratic standards. Every day we see examples of this all over the world.

From Indonesia to the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, Africa and South America the democratic method is looked to for the solution of all general social problems which have various characteristics. It is useful to dwell further on a few aspects of the matter. The first of these is the principle of national self-determination. This principle was applied mainly in the nineteenth century and the greater part of the twentieth century. It was based on the idea of setting up a nation state. The ideology it subscribed to was nationalism. The method it employed was mainly armed struggle and national wars of liberation. It was seen that it had a limited application, but led to great bloodshed and its extreme nationalism engendered long-lasting enmities. This approach which kept the world in a state of tension is still influential, is one whose unhealthy aspects have largely come to light in our day. The struggle that is currently going on in the Balkans clearly shows what a diseased approach this is. The reasons for this are of course its failure to grasp social reality, its narrowly nationalistic approach, and its attempt to find a solution by forcing society and a land where different peoples are intermingled. Naturally this has consequences that amount to savagery. There are many examples of this in history. Many a group or nation choosing to follow this path has, even where triumphant, failed to shed its backwardness and indeed failed to rid itself of many problems born of this inheritance. Because of the approach adopted, the national problem has given rise to even bigger problems every time an attempt was made to solve it. An example of this in history is the religious and sectarian wars in the Middle Ages, the effects of which can still be seen from time to time. Even though the nationalist approach emerged claiming to be a solution to the problems caused by the religious approach, it failed to refrain from following the same methods and made things still more difficult. Although there might be differences between old religious ideologies and the extreme nationalism and its various right and left-wing forms that followed, they are in fact movements that are quite similar and have influenced each other. By the time the twentieth century was reached they had shown that they were evenly matched in terms of bloodshed and savagery. The general democratic theory and practice has been highly successful in dealing with problems created by both extreme religious and extreme nationalist approaches, and countries and societies employing them have triumphed. As we approach the end of the twentieth century, victory belongs to a democracy that is becoming increasingly mature. Indeed the societies that employ this system with conviction and in a controlled knowledgeable manner are the most advanced societies in the world. Their states are the states whose power is acknowledged in the world. This is clear when one looks at the way the US and Great Britain lead and shape the world.

The power of the democratic system undoubtedly rests above all on its scientific grasp of social reality, its ability to provide correct definitions for the moral and philosophical levels and the substructures below these, and the political and legal levels, and to offer a solution which, without employing labels like "progressive" and "regressive" answers the needs of the social forces of the time and their demand for equality and freedom. There is neither denial nor an attempt to bring about a utopia by force. There is no attempt to impose the beliefs and goals, the utopias of a century ago or a century hence. As it presents solutions both in principle and in practice and proves its ability to solve problems, the democratic level of society becomes its level of solution. By forcing its state and its moral values to become democratic it demonstrates that it has a rich variety of solutions at its disposal. What is very important here is the power to offer a practical solution to every problem. What is even more important is that it has the least recourse to violence and that, even when following such a course, it immediately demonstrates its power to initiate a peaceful method.

There are of course historic reasons for all this as well. To put it in very general terms, in both religious wars and wars arising as national and social wars or in revolutions and counter-revolutions, there has been massive bloodshed and there are no major problems left that can be solved through bloodshed or at least there are very few. In general, the path followed by democracy is that of evolution and peace. This is a historical fact. Democracy moves forward on the legacy of suffering left over from the recent and distant past. Its claim is that there have been enough revolutions and co